By: Adrian Mesly
Introduction
In 2021, the Accelerating Access to Justice Act received royal assent resulting in the repeal of section 16 of the Succession Law Reform Act as of January 1, 2022.1 The section enabled the revocation of a will, upon the testator getting married, a doctrine founded on family protection. This begs the question of what both the cause for its repealing by the Ontario government was, as well as what the resulting impact and meaning it creates regarding the perception of marriage and its relationship to succession law. This paper will argue that the repeal of section 16 can be justified as a positive change that better balances the certainty provided by wills with the fairness that succession law, and more broadly, society seeks. I will first examine the theoretical underpinnings of succession law in the two dominant systems: testamentary intention and forced heirship. Following this, I will analyze what motivated the creation of these systems in France, the United States, Germany, and Canada. Building on this analysis, I will examine how the revocation of will by marriage doctrine is representative of a broader shift in succession law across Canada. I will then situate the repeal within the global context of testamentary freedom and forced heirship, demonstrating its strengths in both providing certainty, whilst also balancing fairness. Finally, I will justify the repeal against other possible solutions to the issues which motivated the repeal of section 16 to demonstrate why repealment was the best option.
Theoretical Underpinnings of Succession Law
Historically, succession law was created alongside the right to private property, begging the question of what to do with an individual’s property when they died. Approaches to this question have differed based on fundamental understandings of what rights are associated with private property, and how these rights are to be transferred once a person dies. Two dominant approaches exist along the continuum, where ultimate testamentary freedom exists on one side with forced heirship on the other. Atherton describes testamentary freedom as a “concept of freedom with respect to the power of making wills.”2 In this regard, wills and testamentary freedom allow individuals to dispose of their property upon death, as they please.3 Thus, testamentary freedom gives individuals the choice of who and how they dispose of their property after death.4 In contrast, forced heirship guarantees heirs, meeting certain requirements defined later in this paper, that they will share the decedent’s estate.5 Forced heirship cedes no control to the deceased over their property’s distribution upon death.6 Juxtaposing these two approaches elucidates that the key mechanism differentiating the approach to succession law under these systems is choice. Forced heirship allows no choice to the testator, while testamentary freedom allows full choice over the distribution of property.
Determining whether to give a testator choice is largely a consideration of the social, political, and economical understandings of a given society. Beckert argues that the institutionalization of inheritance law, and which approach a society is founded upon, is a reflection of the broader moral constitutions societies adopt.7 Thus, the value and moral framework defining a society directly frames and shapes the way laws, including those pertaining to succession, are viewed and enacted.8 Thus, to understand the basis for a society’s adoption of testamentary freedom or forced heirship requires one fundamentally understand the social, political, and economic ideals which influence that society, from the past to the present.
Examining the foundations of testamentary freedom exposes its liberal approach to succession law. Atherton argues that testamentary freedom was the dominant doctrine in common law countries for 200 years, before the twentieth century, as it reflected liberalism’s primacy to the individual, free will, even amidst the rise of capitalism.9 Testamentary freedom’s doctrine shares the same philosophical justifications as laissez-faire economics and freedom of contract, which grants individuals a right to both individual determinism and freedom from the State.10 Beckert notes how testamentary freedom arose when ideas of property rights and individualization gained greater popularity and transcended the dominant societal frameworks.11 Atherton argues that testation incentives the accumulation of wealth amidst a capitalist society, and the ability to have fixed inheritance rights distinctive to heirs was attractive to those favouring the liberal approach.12 Testamentary freedom’s theoretical foundations are thus a reflection of the growing liberalism embraced by both individuals and states, and subsequently reflected in the legal systems of common law countries that promote similar ideas of determinism in contract law and capitalistic framework.
In contrast, forced heirship’s foundations show a deeper consideration toward familial understandings of property. Zimmerman points to Roman law as the foundation for forced heirship, wherein the acquisition of property was imperative to keeping family worship intact.13 Property was viewed solely through a family-lens whereby families co-ownership of property ensured each member’s rights to it continued, even beyond the death of another.14 McLearen notes property’s similar historical importance in Roman law, as well as Germanic tribes, with both viewing forced heirship as fundamental to protecting family legacy and tradition.15 The importance of family was thus seen as worthy of protection, influencing the absolute restriction on individual’s freedom to choose their successor.16 Forced heirship is therefore a reflection of greater social importance being placed on protecting the familial unit over one’s individual rights and desires.
Although testamentary freedom and forced heirship exists on extreme sides of a continuum, societies have adopted a middle-ground approach to succession law, which demonstrates the importance placed on both individual freedom and family structures. Current trends in succession law can be seen as balancing testamentary freedom of the individual alongside the rights and claims of family members where there is believed to be an expectation to be provided for.17 Beckert notes how debates in succession law have demonstrated the controversial tensions between these individualistic and family-focused approaches.18 Further considerations and the development of societal understandings, such as the concept of the nuclear family undergoing immense change through the 20th and 21st centuries has also heavily influenced societal and demographic changes in succession law.19 Thus, some societies have adopted a position which favours one approach over the other, tending to permit the limiting of individual freedom to allow for and ensure certain family members have rights to a testator’s estate. The importance of theoretical understandings of succession law help illuminate considerations of the goals and purposes of succession laws in a given society.
United States Succession Law
The United States of America is perhaps the best example wherein testamentary freedom flourishes. Morey argues that the American law of succession focuses on the freedom of disposition rather than expectancy interest of heirs.20 Kelly confirms this notion, writing that American succession law gives individuals a nearly unrestricted right to make choices as to how their property is to be divided when they die.21 Individuals have the ability to use a will, enact a trust, or die by intestacy as options for defining their property’s distribution when they die.22 The US legal system prioritizes the intention of the testator and seeks to as a facilitate intentions, rather than regulate them.23 This system was largely based on the idea that individuals are best-positioned to distribute their property.24 Furthermore, Kelly notes four factors which influenced the US to use a testamentary freedom approach: the desire to maximize the testator’s satisfaction; the incentivization of capital accumulation by allowed control over their money beyond death; the informational advantage of allowing the individual to define who is best-suited to receive money in their family; and the strengthening of family relationships which is facilitated through this approach.25 These foundational principles are closely aligned with the philosophy underpinning testamentary intention as it shares the same individual determinism and laissez-faire mindset that property ownership enables. In this sense, Beckert argues that property is conceptualized as an individualistic-meritocratic institution in the US.26 Notably, the US does restrict freedom to a certain extent to allow for spousal rights, among others, and to curtail wills which maybe contrary to the public interest.27 While a clear example of a society founded on testamentary freedom, the US has still created exceptions meant to promote the public good and broader societal interests.
French Succession Law
France currently operates one of the strongest forced heirship regimes in the world. Forced heirship emerged as a foundational concept in France following the French Revolution at the turn of the 1800s.28 Peres describes the view of wills “as the aristocratic weapon of reactionary fathers.”29 Revolutionaries, concerned with the power a father yielded in exercising their will, favoured a system which defined successions and ensured the promotion of quality among heirs.30 Inheritance law not only changed to the principle of equality, but was also utilized as a means for creating the sociopolitical conditions the revolutionaries desired.31 Beckert argues the principle of equality became a “quasi-sacred normative” point in shaping discourse throughout the twentieth century.32 In France, property has a statist orientation, as although property is protected, the state plays a considerable role in its regulation, so as to secure the common good and equality.33 In contrast to the United States, the history of French succession law exhibits a clear preference for forced heirship given its prioritization of equality and the family. Today, French succession law requires that estates be divided into two portions, wherein a reserved portion is left with all descendants, no matter their age, and the remaining portion can be freely disposed of.34 French inheritance law thus leans towards forced heirship but does retain some elements of testamentary freedom.
German Inheritance Law
In contrast to the French justification of equality, Germany’s forced heirship regime better reflects the familial justification. Beckert notes how protection of the family against individualism was necessary to guard against individual determinism which threatened society’s moral foundations.35 As well, Beckert finds that wills were seen as foreign to the Germanic legal tradition, and the “moral function of inheritance law lies in strengthening the family as the moral foundation of society against an individualism that was regarded as immoral and on the rise.”36 Germany currently balances forced heirship with testamentary freedom, allowing individuals to make wills. However, in its prioritization of the family, should death occur in the absence of a testament, the estate falls to the family.37 Zimmerman notes that similar to France, Germany defines the distribution of property via a will, as well as a the setting aside of a compulsory portion for the family.38 If a testator has disinherited a particular family member, they maintain the ability to claim Pflichtteil an obligatory portion set aside for family specifically for any children, parents and surviving spouses.39 According to Rothel, the German compulsory portion is a claim under the law of obligations, and remaining family members have a claim to one-half of the estate of the testator.40 Germany’s history and current obligations of forced heirship demonstrate a strong commitment and moral duty to provide for the family.
Canadian Inheritance Law
Canada’s foundation in the common law tradition meant that it largely favoured the liberalist approach to testamentary freedom. Popovici and Smith note how unbridled testamentary freedom flourished in Canada in the twentieth century.41 Following this however, the law began to change to favour protecting the families of a deceased person, and obligations of support did not simply vanish upon death.42 Campbell notes that despite this shift, freedom is still at the core of and is given primacy in the law of wills and estates.43 Canada’s succession law remains largely framed around testamentary freedom, however there are elements of forced heirship resulting from concerns around family obligations.
Purpose of the Revocation of Wills in Canada
Before its revocation, section 16 of the SLRA mandated that a will be automatically revoked upon marriage. The doctrine of revocation upon marriage was based on a presumptive intention of the testator. Marriage, as Campbell notes, is not typically seen as an action that directly reflects testamentary intention, especially in contrast with actions such as destroying a physical will.44 However, the provision was based on the presumption that a testator would not have intended to create a will that excluded their spouse.45 Atin notes the rules first codification in England’s Wills Act, 1837 where its purpose was clearly to protect family.46 Marriage was viewed as a fundamental alteration in a person’s life, and thus it was presumed was that most individuals would have intended to protect their spouse after they marry, in line with family considerations.47 Thus, the revocation of will by marriage doctrine arose from the presumed intention that an individual would want their spouse to be protected and receive their property.
Canadian legislative history shows a strong consideration granted towards the family and spouses. The revocation of will at marriage was originally one of many sections which permitted revocation based on a change in circumstance, with marriage being the only change in circumstances still codified in 2021.48 As well, a number of provisions aimed at providing the spouse, especially the wife, protections under the law still exist. Popovici and Smith cite dower laws which gave widows a life interest in one-third of the land owned by the husband and homestead legislation which gave the surviving spouse a life interest in the family home as examples of provisions which aim to protect the family.49 These provisions also reflect common law’s gender-based understandings, and identification of the wife (or female) as requiring, or deserving of, protection. According to Mimnagh, once a woman married, they would be classified as a feme covert, meaning that their legal personality was suspended, and therefore covered by her husband.50 Thus, the revocation of will by marriage doctrine is one of a number of provisions Canada has used to balance the testamentary freedom of the testator with the rights and expectations of the spouse, given a gender-based understanding of power, relationality, property rights, and marriage.
Criticisms and Repealing
The revocation of will upon marriage underwent intense scrutiny prior to its repeal. While wills are created as a document that represent the expression of the testator’s wishes, as such, so to is its revocation.51 Thus, its automatic revocation appears contrary to prioritization of the testator’s intentions. Wills are also ambulatory, meaning they do not take effect until a person dies and can be revoked at any time.52 Thus, if a person’s intention changes, they can easily alter their will. However, marriage’s inadvertent revocation happens by operation rather than express intention.53 Campbell notes how this has led the revocation doctrine to be critiqued for over sixty years prior to its repealing.54 The revocation of will by marriage thus acted as a forced heirship mechanism to ensure protection of the spouse, while completely disregarding the testamentary intentions of the individual.
Another criticism that arose in response to the revocation of will upon marriage centred the issue of predatory marriage. Predatory marriage involves those who pray on the elderly taking advantage of the SLRA’s provisions regarding intestacy distributions.55 The issue of predatory marriage stems from the low requisite capacity necessary to marry, where even in the most obvious cases of exploitation, the common law’s test for capacity to marry is satisfied.56 Miler notes that despite its financial, legal, and social implications, marriage is treated as one of the most basic contracts for which there are few to no safeguards to protect against predation.57 Given that predatory marriage usually targets the elderly, Atin notes how the automatic revocation of wills upon marriage means that individuals may not have the testamentary capacity necessary to invoke a new will, and thus will die in intestacy providing the exploiter with the spousal provisions under the SLRA.58 Miler notes that the testamentary capacity threshold is much higher than the capacity to marry.59 Therefore, predatory marriages became common subject to the revocation of will by marriage doctrine, due to the incompatible thresholds of capacity for both marriage and testament. This has meant that individuals previously entitled could lose large, if not all, shares of the estate that they were once promised.60 Predatory marriages allow exploiters to marry the elderly, revoking their prior will and receive intestacy rewards after death.
These criticisms appear to provide some of the impetus for section 16’s repeal. Members of the provincial legislature all displayed these concerns when speaking to its repeal in the Accelerating Access to Justice Act. Attorney General Doug Downey stated that repealing section 16 would “make it easier for Ontarians to make decisions about their wills,” as well as citing the lack of knowledge about the revocation of will by marriage doctrine in Ontario.61 MPP Lindsey Park spoke to the need for modernizing inheritance law, recognizing that revoking wills should be an intentional choice, even in the context of marriage.62 MPP Jim McDonell explained that the changes in the Act were influenced by estate lawyers who cited numerous clients that were concerned about predatory marriages.63 MPP Robert Bailey also cited concerns around predatory marriages and the fact that spouses may get their wills done before marriage and fail to add a very specific provision that would reject the revocation of will by marriage doctrine.64 Bailey also emphasized that the repeal would “help ensure that when someone passes away, their assets are going to go to the people that they truly intended them to go to.”65 Evidently, underscoring the repeal of section 16 was a desire to ensure that testamentary intention was respected and end predatory marriages by the revocation of will by marriage doctrine. This move aligns with Canada’s balance between forced heirship and testamentary intention, favouring the former, and following alongside its previous repealing’s of change in circumstances doctrines.
Justification of Repealing Section 16
Succession law is often framed in terms of certainty and fairness. Absolute testamentary freedom is said to be certain in providing the intentions of the testator to flourish. Whereas absolute forced heirship is said to be fair, whereby the testator’s intention is irrelevant to the consideration, and an equal distribution of property is provided to certain heirs. In considering the evaluation of a law, a more nuanced and in-depth analysis can illustrate the certainty and fairness argument in relation to the vast number of actors involved. The revocation of section 16 falls closer on the side of certainty in terms of its fulfilment of the testator’s intentions. At the same time, the revocation of section 16 is fairer to those already included in the will. It allows them to inherit what the testator intended them to, without losing a significant amount of their share had a predatory marriage occurred. At the same time, the revocation of section 16 is unfair to those spouses who had been in a marriage with non-predatory motivations with the testator but had failed to be included in the last will of the testator. Thus, while the decision to repeal section 16 of the SLRA was a choice based on certainty, it had fairness elements targeting those unrightly disposed of their possible inheritance by predatory marriages. Overall, the decision appears to favour testamentary freedom over forced heirship.
Repealing section 16 of the SLRA is a justified and positive decision by the Ontario government as it modernizes succession laws in Canada. Kelly notes how testamentary freedom is a relatively modern idea with western countries only recently beginning to adopt it.66 Alongside the shift to testamentary freedom, societies have undergone changes that alter spousal and familial contexts. One such factor is the increase in life expectancy, whereby individuals are living far beyond their productive employment duration and now utilize their savings during a longer retirement.67 As such, less money is available for inheritance, meaning successful predatory marriages have gained a greater percentage of the testator’s estate. Furthermore, as Griesdorf notes, marriage is more than a contract, it functions as an expression of self worth and dignity.68 While marriage is not the only relationship to serve such functions, Vlaardingerbroek posits that western societies have seen structural shifts in the perception of familial relationships as there is a growing recognition of structures beyond the nuclear family.69 Furthermore, divorce rates have risen drastically over the past century.70 Griesdorf acknowledges how the increase of second marriages, children from earlier marriages, and increased divorce rates has created greater variance in and the unfair disposition of estates through the automatic revocation of wills upon marriage doctrine.71 Hirsch notes how fiancés often make explicit commitments to one another, but are not recognized by law as having the same entitlements as married couples.72 Thus, as perceptions of family structures change, marriages have become less representative of who is, or ought to be, most valued in the event of death. Therefore, the justification of presuming an intent to revoke a will by marriage is less justified and appears to penalize the testamentary intention of only those who have entered into the traditional contract of marriage.
Alongside this, the significance of a will to family structures has also lost significance. Thirty years ago, wills were seen as “economic documents of vital importance” but have since lost such importance.73 Spouses can now jointly purchase property together and on life insurance, name their spouse as the beneficiary when they pass.74 The Ontario legislature also recognized the waning importance of wills. MPP Park notes how many couples choose to not get married but purchase major assets together, such as cars or homes.75 MPP Bailey stated similar sentiments whereby couples are able to put both their names on the title of an asset.76 As new forms of ownership arise between couples and societal understandings of the family have shifted further from the typical nuclear family, the importance of wills has dropped significantly. Typical gendered assumptions about the role of men and women in society in relation to owning property have also evolved, and thus, the ability for both spouses to hold property has led to joint ownership in major assets. Thus, testamentary dispositions of major assets may be regulated by joint ownership or beneficiary structures rather than the will. Thus, the justification of revoking a will by marriage is weakened when considering the couples’ ability to possess and hold assets together.
In consideration with these factors, Ontario legislation provides spouses with the ability to claim shares of a deceased’s estate. Under section 58(1) of the SLRA, a deceased, whether they die with or without a will, may be ordered to provide adequate compensation for dependents.77 Dependents, per section 57(1), include the spouse of the deceased.78 Furthermore, the Family Law Act provides under section 5(2) that when a spouse dies, if the net value of the surviving spouse’s net family property is less than the deceased spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half the difference.79 Griesdorf notes how such provisions in the SLRA and FLA make section 16 of the SLRA redundant, given that there is already forced heirship between spouses.80 Furthermore, the definitions of spouse in the SLRA and FLA are not solely confined to married couples. Spousal protection extends to married couples in relation to section 5(2) of the FLA,81 and further includes those who have cohabited together for a period of three years or are in a relationship where they have a child,82 or are divorced in relation to section 58(1) of the SLRA.83 Thus, Ontario legislation already enforced forced heirship to ensure spousal protection. In some respects, this coverage extends further to non-married couples, illustrating the advancement of societal understandings of family and worthy heirs. Section 16 was thus redundant given that there is already forced heirship in Ontario. Furthermore, section 16 was less conducive to modern understandings of family property, and due to the current statutory provisions, was rendered obsolete.
Ontario’s move to repeal section 16 is consistent with the broader landscape across Canada. Whaley found that five other provinces and territories have enacted legislation whereby marriage does not revoke a will.84 Ontario and Canada’s growing movement to repeal such legislation aligns with the global succession law. In France, the revocation of will by marriage doctrine does not exist. Rather, article 1035 of the French Code Civil states that wills can only be revoked by a subsequent will or by a deed declaring a change of will.85 In the United States, section 2-508 of the Uniform Probate Code articulates that a change in circumstance does not revoke a will, unless the couple gets divorced, in which case provisions granting devises to the ex-spouse will be revoked, or a person committed homicide to get their benefits.86 In Germany, the revocation of will by marriage doctrine does not exist. Rather, section 2079 of the German Civil Code allows a person entitled to a compulsory portion to challenge a will on the basis that the testator would have liked to have changed their will.87 Thus, the revocation of will by marriage doctrine is non-existent elsewhere. Each system has its own underlying philosophy, from equality, individual determinism, and family relationships, however none impose a presumed intention of revocation because of marriage. Each system, as explored earlier, has forced heirship mandates for family members demonstrating the importance of the family in relation to inheritance.
The importance of family and spousal rights is engrained in Canada’s history. However, as the global landscape begins to move ever closer between a balance of testamentary freedom and forced heirship, section 16’s operation was counterintuitive to such an approach. Section 16’s repeal thus facilitated an alignment with the global standard. Furthermore, the changing societal circumstances relating to family structures and the waning significance of both marriage and wills, and the forced heirship mandates present in the SLRA and FLA all help to justify the repealing of section 16. By repealing section 16, Ontario is ensuring certainty in testamentary dispositions by following wills made by testators, while the fairness goals originally implemented by section 16 are achieved elsewhere through forced heirship. Such a balance is seen in the examples of France, Germany, and the United States whereby each system has implemented a similar approach to forced heirship and testamentary freedom with different limitations. Thus, section 16’s repealment is a justified and significant move in favour of providing certainty, whilst fairness is still achieved.
Alternative Solutions
Scholarship regarding the revocation of will by marriage doctrine has produced a number of possible solutions besides repealing section 16. One possible solution proposed by Miler is instituting a similar rule to California’s elder abuse slayer rule.88 Section 259 of the California Probate Code extends the slayer rule, that one should not benefit from their murder, to elder abuse, protecting against predatory marriages.89 Morey supports an adoption of this rule on the basis that it rules out unworthy heirs.90 Such a proposition appears useful as it allows the testator’s family to challenge a marriage on the grounds that it was predatory, and is thus able to retain their estate. The slayer rule extension to elder abuse is rooted in a fairness argument and thus would not repeal section 16, instead revoking prior wills. However, it seems incongruent to Canadian inheritance law as although it solves the problem of predatory marriages, it still allows for the breaching of testamentary intentions of others who were not in predatory marriages. Hirsch notes that when individuals take the time and effort to execute a will, it is likely that they will amend and change it as they see fit over the course of their life.91 Thus, simply adding in the slayer rule would leave the testamentary intentions of many revoked. As articulated above, Ontario’s system already provides for families left out of a will or testament, and thus, the original goal of section 16 remains achieved. Therefore, the slayer rule is only a solution against one of the two reasons for repeal, that being predatory marriage. Repealing section 16 is thus more favourable as it coincides with Canada’s lean towards testamentary freedom, granting greater certainty of providing the testator’s wishes, whilst there are still forced heirship mechanisms for family members.
Another possible solution provided by Miler is the German law of Drohung. This is a similar concept to undue influence, whereby if a testator revokes a will or makes a will under the Drohung of another person, the will would be declared void, and the person is also ineligible from receiving intestacy dispositions.92 However, this solution also does not address the testator’s intentions. While ensuring that predatory marriages are not rewarded, Drohung would not allow for the testamentary intentions of the testator to be fulfilled as the will under section 16 would still be revoked. Both proposed changes also require litigation, meaning that family members initiate a formal legal challenge to the will. Litigation costs are enormous and whether paid by the estate or by the individual, such costs and time pressures may weigh against a person’s decision, or ability to challenge the will.
Other possible solutions have been explored in literature relating to numerous changes such as capacity to marry, stricter marriage officiants, among many others. Repealing section 16 is the most favourable solution of them all. Given the changing context of family structures, the worldwide development of a balance between forced heirship and testamentary freedom, forced heirship laws in the SLRA and FLA, and its alignment with global standards, the repealing of section 16 is the best choice. Thus, the move for greater certainty and respect for testamentary intentions is a preferable choice as it strikes a better balance between forced heirship and testamentary freedom that societies have moved toward.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that Ontario’s repealing of Section 16 of the SLRA’s revocation of will by marriage doctrine was justified. Through examining the philosophical underpinnings of Canadian, French, German, and American inheritance law, an understanding into the goals and motivations driving succession law were found. Using these philosophical underpinnings, this paper examined the revocation of will doctrine through its goal of providing fairness to the family of the testator. In doing so, this paper has argued that changes in societal understanding of family, the waning importance of marriage and wills, and the global shift to a balanced system of testamentary freedom and forced heirship required that the doctrine be revoked. Examining Ontario’s forced heirship elements revealed that goals of the revocation of will by marriage doctrine are achieved elsewhere and are more broadly aligned to societal understandings of family, making the doctrine redundant. By revoking the doctrine, the Ontario legislature has ensured testamentary certainty through keeping wills made before marriages, whilst a balance of fairness is still achieved.
Table of Authorities
Legislation: Ontario
Accelerating Access to Justice Act, 2021, SO 2021, c 4 – Bill 245.
Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3.
Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S.26.
Legislation: France
C Civ.
Legislation: Germany
Civil Code (Germany).
Legislation: United States
Uniform Probate Code (1969).
Government Documents: Reports
Ontario, “Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard)”, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 224 (22 February 2021).
Ontario, “Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard)”, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 225A (23 February 2021).
Ontario, “Legislative Assembly, Official report of Debates (Hansard)”, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 226A (24 February 2021).
Ontario, “Legislative Assembly, Official report of Debates (Hansard)”, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 227 (25 February 2021).
Secondary Sources: Books
Atherton, Rosalind F and Prue Vines, “Succession: Families, Property and Death: Text and Cases”, 2nd ed (Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003).
Beckert, Jans, “Inherited Wealth” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, c2008). Sawyer, Caroline and Miriam Spero, “Succession, Wills and Probate”, 3rd ed (London: Routledge, 2015).
Schwab, Dieter, Peter Gottwald and Saskia Lettmaier, “Family and Succession Law in Germany”, 3rd ed (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2017).
Secondary Sources: Essays from a Collection of Essays
Atheron, Rosalind F, “Testamentary Freedom: A Motherhood Statement” in Rosalind F. Atherton, ed, “Papers of the International Academy of Estate and Trust Law” (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 273.
Peres, Cecile, “Compulsory Portion in France” in Kenneth GC Reid, Marious J de Waal & Reinhard Zimmerman, eds, “Comparative Succession Law” (Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press, 2020) 78.
Popovici, Alexandra and Lionel Smith, “Freedom of Testation and Family Claims in Canada” in Kenneth GC Reid, Marious J de Waal & Reinhard Zimmerman, eds, “Comparative Succession Law” (Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press, 2020) 507.
Rothel, Anne, “Law of Succession and Testamentary Freedom in Germany” in Miriam Anderson and Esther Arroyo i Amayuelas, ed, “The Law of Succession: Testamentary Freedom: European Perspectives” (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, c2011) 157.
Zimmerman, Reinhard, “Compulsory Portion in Germany” in Kenneth GC Reid, Marious J de Waal & Reinhard Zimmerman, eds, “Comparative Succession Law” (Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press, 2020) 268.
Zimmerman, Reinhard, “Protection against Being Passed Over or Disinherited in Roman law” in Kenneth GC Reid, Marious J de Waal & Reinhard Zimmerman, eds, “Comparative Succession Law” (Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press, 2020) 1.
Secondary Sources: Journals
Atin, Jordan M, “Revocation of Wills by Marriage” (1998) 18:1 ETPJ 13.
Campbell, Angela, “I Do, I Will” (2014) 47 UBC L Rev 367.
de Waal, M.J, “The Social and Economic Foundations of the Law of Succession” (1997) 8:2 Stellenbosch L Rev 162.
Griesdorf, Wendy L, “Crazy in Love: Caregiver Marriages in the Context of Estate Disputes” (2005-2006) 25 ETPJ 315.
Hirsch, Adam J, “Inheritance on the Fringes of Marriage” (2018) 2018:1 U Ill L Rev 235.
Kelly, Daniel B, “Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications” (2003) 82:3 Fordham L Rev 1125.
McLearen, Ryan, “International Forced Heirship: Concerns and Issues with European Forced Heirship Claims” (2011) 3:2 Est Plan & Cmty Prop LJ 323.
Miler, Dorota, “Elder Exploitation Through Predatory Marriage” (2012-2013) 28 Can J Fam L 11.
Mimnagh, Louise M, “A History of Preferential Share in Ontario: Intestacy Legislation and Conceptions of the Deserving or Underserving Widow” (2014) 23 Dal J Leg Stud 1.
Morey, Mary Elizabeth, “Unworthy Heirs: The Slayer Rule and beyond” (2010) 109:4 Ky LJ 787.
Vlaardingerbroek, Paul, “Changing Family Forms and the Law of Succession” (1999) 7:4 Tilburg Foreign L Rev 347.
Secondary Sources: Electronic Sources
Whaley, Kimberly A, “Predatory Marriages and the Capacity to Marry” (November 2023), online: Predatory Marriages and the Capacity to Marry.