(uniquement en anglais)
by Paul Chorney
Introduction
Ever since the early 2000’s, there have been many global conflicts, such as those in Syria and Iraq, and, more recently, in Palestine and Iran, that have warranted large humanitarian aid efforts.1 These overseas humanitarian efforts are often funded through charities in Canada. While the majority of the charitable activities operating in conflict zones are legitimate, there is an opportunity for these charities to be taken advantage of by terrorist organizations. Preventing any amount of money from reaching these terrorist organizations is imperative for protecting Canadian national security.
Charities and non-profit organizations are seen by terrorists as the ideal vehicle to both propagate their ideologies and raise funds through the large number of donors.2 The vulnerability of charities lies in the inherent trust placed in them by the community at large, their cash-intensive nature, and their historical under-regulation compared to other financial sectors.3 As of 2022, the non-profit sector accounted for about 8.2% of the country’s gross domestic product, which is about $216.5 billion.4 Accounting for such a large amount of money makes it imperative that regulatory measures are in place to prevent terrorist financing and abuse, although it also becomes difficult to fully regulate such a large share of the Canadian economy. Even a small amount of money funding terrorist activities can result in horrific results, which justifies the need for both criminal and regulatory liability. Canada’s anti-terrorist funding strategy relies on a wide variety of regulatory bodies, such as the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).5
In Canada, since 2008, there have been only 14 instances in which charities have had their charitable status revoked due to suspicions of terrorist financing.6 Considering that, as of 2023, there were approximately 86,000 registered charities, the rate of terrorist financing cases is quite low.7 There may be other explanations for such a low figure, such as under-detection. However, even a relatively small amount of money reaching the wrong hands can have grave impacts. This figure raises the question that maybe the current regime is working and nothing further needs to be done. Although this perspective is too optimistic as there are other costs to take into consideration when determining the effectiveness of the current regime.
One consideration is the chill effect where individuals may become hesitant to donate or participate in charitable activities out of fear of being reprimanded by the anti-terrorist funding regime.8 This highlights the need to protect a careful balance of charities still being able to function efficiently and receive donations but also protect the sector from abuse by terrorist organizations. While anti-terrorism laws may have the goal of preventing funds from reaching terrorist organizations, there may be the negative side effect of discouraging legitimate charitable activity.
This paper will argue that the Canadian anti-terrorism laws that seek to prevent terrorist financing are overly strict, resulting in a chill effect on legitimate charities that conduct humanitarian efforts. Given the relatively low cost of many terrorist attacks and the administrative burdens imposed on charities, stricter anti-terrorism financing regimes may not be proportionate to their benefits.
To address the issue, this paper will first provide an overview of the evolution of current anti-terrorist financing laws and then examine Canada’s current safeguards. The third section will explain how and why terrorist organizations exploit charities. The fourth section will provide the analysis to determine whether stricter laws are proportionately worth the benefit relative to the resulting chill.
1. Background of Canadian Anti-Terrorism Law
1.1. Defining Terrorism in the Criminal Code
The term “terrorist activity” is defined in the Criminal Code under section 83.01(1)(b) as an act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause with the intention of intimidating the public that intentionally causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence, or causes substantial property damage.9
The Criminal Code also establishes a working definition for “financing of terrorism” in section 83.02. Where every person who directly or indirectly, and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used in order to carry out a terrorist activity.10 Section 83.08(1) further states that “no person in Canada and no Canadian outside Canada shall knowingly… provide any financial or other related services in respect of property… for the benefit of or at the direction of a terrorist group.”11
More specifically, in the application of charities, terrorist financing can be described as the exploitation by terrorists and terrorist organizations to raise or move funds, provide logistical support, encourage recruitment, or other support of terrorist operations.12
1.2. Evolution of Canadian Anti-Terrorism Law
(a) Air India Bombing (1985)
In 1985, on Air India Flight 182, a flight from Toronto to London, a luggage bomb exploded over the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 329 people on board.13 This remains the single worst terrorist attack in Canadian history. It was later determined that Talwinder Singh Parmar, the mastermind behind the bombing, had founded a Sikh group called the Babbar Khalsa (BK), a terrorist organization deeply involved in the bombing.14 The BK was later granted charitable status in the early 1990’s, after the bombing, although the status was revoked in 1996.15
The fact that the BK was successful in its application for charitable status raised serious questions and calls for reform to terrorist financing regulations. The Air India Bombing exposed the lack of anti-terrorism measures and the need for reform. During the period of pre-2001, there was still no formulated definition for what “terrorism” was and no steadfast regulation or prohibition on financing terrorism. It was not until 2006 and finished in 2010 that the Canadian government conducted an inquiry into the bombing.16 As a result of the inquiry, 29 recommendations were made, none of which related to preventing terrorist financing or financing from charities.17
(b) September 11, 2001, Attack
The Air India bombing exposed the fact that there were gaps in Canadian legislation regarding terrorism, although the Canadian Government did not act promptly. The September 11, 2001, attack by al Qaeda on the World Trade Center in New York City, which caused close to 3,000 deaths, acted as the catalyst for a global shift in terrorism regimes.18 Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Canadian Government began to acknowledge that implementing regulations to prevent terrorism was imperative to protect Canadians.
The United Nations Security Council quickly called upon all its member states to ensure that the financing of terrorism was treated as a crime moving forward.19 Just three months later, on December 18, 2001, Bill C-36 received Royal Assent, enacting the Anti-Terrorism Act.20 The Criminal Code was amended to criminalize intentional terrorism financing and provide the ability to freeze and forfeit terrorist funds. One way this was accomplished was by adding section 83.01, which defined terrorism.21
The Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) also amended the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act. These changes created a regime where the ministers of public safety and national revenue could revoke the charitable status of charities on the basis that they had made or would provide resources to a terrorist organization.22
Furthermore, following the September 11, 2001, attacks, new measures were implemented in 2006 to combat terrorist financing through amendments to the anti-money laundering legislation. This change expanded the range of Canadian entities that are required to report to the Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC), the financial intelligence agency.23
(c) Bill C-41 (2023)
In 2021, the United States withdrew its military from Afghanistan, leading to the Taliban taking control of the local government, which created numerous challenges in delivering foreign humanitarian aid to the region.24 At that time, sections 83.02 and 83.03 of the Criminal Code stated that any direct or indirect assistance to a terrorist organization was an indictable offence.25 This created a difficult situation for Canadian charities if they wanted to provide humanitarian aid in Afghanistan.
Once the Taliban took control of the government, among other state functions, they would have collected taxes. When a Canadian charity imported goods into the country for aid, such as valuable medicine, it would be subject to taxation by the Taliban.26 This would fall under the Criminal Code’s definition of financing terrorism, which led to Canadian charities not providing aid to the country.
On June 20, 2023, Bill C-41, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, was passed to resolve this issue.27 Bill C-41 amended the Criminal Code section 83.03 to allow humanitarian exceptions and the establishment of an Authorization Regime for specific activities in terrorist controlled areas such as Afghanistan.28
The first exception is under section 83.03(3) of the Criminal Code, which provides immunity for section 83.03(2) when a charity makes property or services available to a terrorist organization.29 In section 83.03, the charity must obtain authorization from the Public Safety Minister. Under section 83.032(1), the Code provides that the Public Safety Minister may authorize in a geographic area controlled by a terrorist group, an activity that falls under the following categories: providing or supporting the provision of health services, education, programs to assist individuals in earning a livelihood, services related to immigration or supporting operations of a federal minister or a department or agency of the Government of Canada.30
The Humanitarian Assistance Exception in section 83.03(4) of the Criminal Code permits activities by impartial humanitarian organizations providing aid, as long as they take measures to minimize any benefits to the terrorist group. If a charity meets the strict criteria for this exception, they do not have to apply.31
The guidance provided for what constitutes a “humanitarian assistance activity” is non-exhaustive, although it may contain the following: assistance that attempts to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population, providing support services necessary to enable life-saving activities, or transactions necessary and incidental to carrying out humanitarian activities.32
The differentiating factor between the two exemptions is that the Humanitarian Assistance Exemption requires urgent action to save lives or alleviate suffering. An example would be providing food and medical assistance during a famine, whereas a routine annual campaign to eradicate hunger may not be granted this exemption.33
2. Current Safeguards in Canada
2.1. Primary Legislation
The current regulatory regime in Canada for preventing terrorist financing and the abuse of charities relies on a nationwide approach that involves collaboration among several partners. At the core, the regime is based on the legislative framework of four key statutes: the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA),34 the Criminal Code,35 the Income Tax Act (ITA),36 the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the Charities Registration (Securities Information) Act.37
The PCMLTFA ensures that the proper information is being submitted to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre.38 The PCMLTFA establishes strict obligations for the private sector regarding record-keeping, identity verification, reporting suspicious transactions, and registering financial information with federal partners.39
The Criminal Code, as described above, supplies important definitions for what constitutes “terrorism” in section 83.01, financing of terrorism in section 83.02, and what is a “terrorist activity” in section 83.08(1).40
The Charities Registration (Securities Information) Act (CRSI) created the Review and Analysis Division (RAD), which is administered under the CRA. RAD is responsible for delivering the CRA’s mandate under the Anti-Terrorism Act to prevent the abuse of charities.41 The CRSI also provides the legislative framework for the CRA to use intelligence information that may reveal an organization’s ties to terrorism.42 Section 2(1) states that the Act’s purpose is to ensure that charitable status is reserved only for organizations that operate exclusively for charitable purposes.43
The CRA also uses the ITA to revoke charitable status when it is abused by terrorist organizations. In 2001, changes were made to the ITA to address gaps in the legislation. Some of these changes included allowing for the immediate revocation of charitable status if the organization is listed as a terrorist entity (section 168(3.1)), preventing individuals with a history of terrorism from holding a position of power in a charity, and the ability for the CRA to revoke charitable status if the charity provides false statements.44
2.2. Canada’s Risk Mitigation Framework
Canada’s anti-terrorist financing regime relies on a coordinated approach from many different federal agencies that work together to mitigate the threats of supporting overseas terrorist organizations. The current framework consists of 13 agencies which include the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the CRA, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Finance Canada, the Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED), Justice Canada, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC), Public Safety Canada, Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).45
Canada’s financial intelligence unit, FINTRAC, is one of the primary operatives under the regime that conducts financial assessments and publishes intelligence reports to promote awareness of potential risks.46 Its two mandates are compliance of private entities under the PCMLTFA with their reporting and record-keeping obligations, as well as financial intelligence to detect and prevent terrorist activity financing.47
The National Inherent Risk Assessment (NIRA) is another tool that Canada’s prevention regime uses to understand ongoing terrorist financing trends and methods to help inform new policies.48 NIRA also helps determine which economic sectors are most vulnerable to exploitation for terrorist financing purposes.49
The CRA plays a major role in safeguarding the charitable sector from abuse by terrorist organizations. The CRA also reviews applications for charitable status and may deny an application if there is a risk of terrorist abuse. It receives information from other federal partners relevant to financial investigations of terrorist activities, which it can use to fulfill its obligations under the ITA to revoke charitable status.50 It can also regularly audit charities to ensure charities maintain their disclosure obligations under the ITA. The CRA also provides assistance to charities to help them better protect themselves from abuse. This is accomplished with a two-step checklist for charities. The first step is to identify and document the risks, which involves determining where a charity is more susceptible to risk, such as a fundraiser with large amounts of cash.51 The second step is to apply measures to mitigate the charities identified risks. The CRA checklist states that this can be accomplished by ensuring resources are used correctly, managing unique risks, maintaining adequate books and records, and implementing internal financial controls.52
In summary, the effectiveness of Canada’s regulatory system is dependent on the coordinated efforts and sharing of intelligence by federal agencies. Otherwise, this system would struggle to prevent terrorist financing and the abuse of charities.
3. Terrorist Exploitation of Charities
Major terrorism events such as the Air India Flight 182 Bombing and the September 11, 2001 attacks illustrate the significant harm that terrorism can cause. However, understanding how and why terrorist organizations exploit charities is essential to assessing the rationale behind Canada’s extensive regulatory regime aimed at preventing terrorist financing and the abuse of charitable organizations.
3.1. Why Are Charities Targeted?
Terrorist organizations choose to target charities for many reasons. The first being that they can gain access to legitimate streams of financial resources, often going undetected by passing as a legitimate charitable enterprise.53 The second reason is that charities often operate on a global scale, particularly in conflict zones where terrorist organizations are prevalent, which makes financing terrorist activities much easier.54 Finally, charities maintain high levels of public trust, which attracts less suspicion than other financial avenues.55
The degree of risk that an individual charity may face will greatly depend on a multitude of factors. These may include: if a charity is operating in a conflict zone, conducting fundraisers that utilize cash, or if it works with individuals who are targeted by a terrorist organization for potential recruitment or support.56
3.2. Methods of Exploitation
Although not immediately apparent, terrorist organizations may exploit a charity in various ways and for many reasons. The primary reason is to use the charity’s financial resources by passing as a legitimate organization.57 For example, a charity may transfer funds or other assets to an organization to provide aid, without realizing that the organization is connected to a terrorist group. A charity may also provide medical aid to a group that they believe is legitimate, yet it is controlled by a terrorist organization.58
The second way that charities are exploited is by their officials, staff and volunteers. With the higher degree of trust that accompanies charities, there are often lower levels of screening, training, and controls.59 This can enable an individual with ties to a terrorist organization to join the charity in a position of influence. Once in the charity, the individual may travel to conflict zones undetected to join the terrorist organization or raise funds under the charity’s name, without its knowledge, to support terrorism.60 Another example is an individual who uses their position to recruit others into a terrorist organization by sharing recruitment materials or promoting the organization’s ideals through a charity.
The third way a terrorist organization may exploit a charity is by using an intermediary to divert resources from legitimate charitable purposes to the terrorist organization.61 When a charity uses an intermediary to conduct its humanitarian aid overseas, it opens itself up to far greater risk of abuse. This may be seen through the intermediary being associated with a terrorist organization or redirecting the funds to an organization with terrorist ties.62 Further, the initial charity diminishes its ability to ensure that funds reach its intended beneficiary.
3.3. Case Study
The previously mentioned methods of exploitation are particularly evident in the context of the civil conflicts in Syria and Iraq. These conflicts provide a concrete picture of how terrorist-affiliated groups exploit charities engaged in humanitarian aid and the lengths they will go to avoid detection.63 For example, a British-born terrorist in Syria named Omar Hussein described how he used the cover of a charity to avoid detection because he knew he was being monitored. He would send fake emails to organizations asking about food and accommodations, researching orphanages, and how to adopt children.64 All of this was done to show that he was acting for a charitable purpose. Other cases showed terrorists creating fake social media pages where they would carefully curate and post images working with orphans.65 This ultimately makes it difficult for intelligence agencies to determine what constitutes a legitimate purpose.
The guise of providing humanitarian aid played by individuals with terrorist affiliations in conflict zones is also beneficial for their family members. The families of individuals who die while being associated with a terrorist organization can avoid the stigma associated with the terrorist group by claiming they were conducting overseas humanitarian work.66
The above reasons that explain how charities are taken advantage of by individuals associated with terrorist organizations illustrate that the abuse of charities is prevalent. This further justifies the necessity for Canada to maintain a strong regulatory regime for preventing the exploitation of charities and terrorist financing.
4. Analysis: Are Stricter Laws Proportionate to Their Benefits?
This section aims to evaluate whether Canada’s anti-terrorism financing regime is proportionate to its objective of preventing terrorism. While the legislation strives to protect national security and prevent terrorist financing, these regulations also impose high costs on the charitable sector. This analysis weighs these competing considerations and argues that the legislation imposes costs that outweigh the marginal benefits.
4.1. Benefits of Greater Anti-Terrorism Legislation
Ever since the Air India Flight 182 Bombing in 1985 and the September 11, 2001, Attacks, the importance of implementing anti-terrorist legislation has become clear. To protect national security and ensure that Canadian’s feel safe at home, it was of the utmost importance to regulate terrorist financing to prevent future terrorist attacks. Not only were anti-terrorism laws important, but they were also necessary to fulfill Canada’s obligations under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which called on all states to ensure that the financing of terrorism was a crime.67
Not only does anti-terrorism financing legislation protect national security, but it also helps maintain donor confidence in the charitable sector. Without strict regulation, donors may lose trust that their funds are being used for their intended purpose. This could result in a decline in charitable donations, which is far worse than the resulting effect of overly stringent laws.
4.2. The Limits of Terrorist Financing Legislation
There are several practical limits to implementing terrorist financing laws. The first is that acts of terrorism are relatively cheap to conduct. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center were the most expensive single act of terrorism and only cost less than half a million dollars.68 For a single individual, that would be considered a large sum of money, although when it is done by a much larger terrorist organization, such as al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, who had a reputation as a financier, it is a much smaller figure.69 When the US Government concluded its Commission following the September 11, 2001, attacks, it stated that “trying to starve the terrorists of funds is like trying to catch one kind of fish by draining the ocean.”70 The cost of the effort is not justifiable for the outcome.
While the cost to conduct the September 11, 2001 attacks falls on the higher end, the majority of other attacks cost far less. For example, the 1985 Air India Flight 182 bombing cost between an estimated $3,000 and $10,000.71 The 2002 Bali bombings cost $20,000, the 2004 Madrid bombings cost 15,000 Euros, and the 2005 London bombings only cost a few hundred pounds.72
These are all examples where a terrorist attack was carried out with a relatively small amount of funding. Individuals who intend to carry out attacks will often find a way to do so regardless of the amount of funds available to them. The majority of the individuals who conducted these attacks were lone actors, carrying out the attack with little sophistication and few resources. Often, individuals are inspired by the actions of larger terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda.73 Preventing individual actors who are inspired by the actions of larger organizations becomes much harder to prevent, as it is far easier for them to be undetected prior to the event.
Focusing on the low costs of terrorist acts is an ineffective method because there are higher costs associated with maintaining a terrorist organization that could be prevented.74 Having strict regulations on terrorist financing may provide a false sense of security that it will provide adequate safety in preventing future terrorist attacks in Canada. Therefore, having stringent legislation on terrorist financing may be limited in scope and inefficient, given the costs associated with greater regulation.
4.3. Costs of Stricter Anti-Terrorism Legislation
There are four main costs associated with implementing stricter anti-terrorism legislation. There the a chill effect on charities and humanitarian aid, an increased discrimination risk, the administrative burdens, which include higher costs of maintaining charitable compliance, and de-risking by banks.
(a) The Chill Effect on Charitable Giving
The first major cost of a stringent anti-terrorism regime is the chill effect, which becomes evident in practice, specifically in high-risk areas. While there is a need to maintain strict anti-terrorist financing measures to prevent charities from being exploited, there must be a careful balance to avoid overly burdensome legislation that could chill charitable giving from the public sector. The chill effect occurs when an individual is deterred by fear of legal repercussions and engages in self-censorship, refraining from a certain activity that is fully legal or even beneficial.75 In the context of charities, the chill effect would be evident as the public becomes hesitant to donate or offer humanitarian aid due to concerns about strict regulations on terrorist financing.76 The chill is also evident as individuals avoid risking legal liability, or charities fear losing their charitable status.
An example of the chill effect on charities was evident in 2023, following the introduction of Bill C-41, which introduced two new exceptions to sections 83.01 and 83.02 of the Criminal Code.77 During this time, charities faced difficulties using the exceptions, as there was a lack of guidance on how to apply for them.78 The chill effect was evident here, as charities were legally able to use the exemption to provide humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, although in practice they chose not to apply for it out of fear that they would not fall within the exemption’s scope.79 This resulted in delays and reductions in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan during this period.
The chill effect of stringent regulations on terrorist financing is not a mere inconvenience faced by charities, but is an issue that becomes obvious in practice. It leads to reduced aid, fewer donations and charities withdrawing from high-risk areas due to the fear of criminal liability and the inability to fulfill stringent requirements.
The chill effect is evident at a local level when individual donations received decrease due to the high regulatory demands, although it can also be seen at the government level. For example, in 2011, during the Somalia Famine, where nearly 30,000 children perished due to malnutrition, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) stated that it struggled to provide humanitarian aid.80 This was because the majority of Somalia at the time was controlled by al-Shabaab, a designated terrorist group, meaning that if the US provided humanitarian aid to the country, there was a high likelihood of incidental support of this terrorist organization.81 Similar to Canadian law, this would have constituted financing terrorist activities and would be in violation of the criminal code in both Canada and the US. This resulted in the chill effect of the US withholding about $50 million in humanitarian aid for Somalia.82
Another example was in 2004 when a tsunami hit Sri Lanka. Foreign aid to the area was hampered due to the region being controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist organization, which could have caused criminal liability for those who provided humanitarian aid to the area.83 In this case, medical supplies were eventually provided because they fall under the exemption in the American statute.84
Having overly strict anti-terrorism financing laws causes administrative burdens, higher compliance costs, and banks de-risking, which may ultimately have a chilling effect and discourage charitable work.
(b) Discrimination Risk
The second major cost associated with stringent anti-terrorist financing legislation is the risk of discrimination. The issue of discrimination and bias is a major problem with many issues surrounding anti-terrorist financing regimes and could be dealt with at great length, although for the purpose of this paper it will be limited in scope.
People and charities with common Arab or Muslim names are disproportionately affected and face far greater scrutiny in terms of the enforcement of Canadian anti-terrorism laws.85 Not only are Muslim charities subject to greater scrutiny, but this results in fewer donations from individuals, as there is a fear of negative repercussions to those who donate to these charities.86 The general bias against Muslim individuals was exacerbated following the September 11, 2001 attacks, which were conducted by al Qaeda, an Islamist militant organization.87 The bias against Muslim-led charities is also evident when the CRA determines whether the charity is carrying out a charitable purpose, as this decision involves discretionary judgment where bias can surface.88
In Muslim Association of Canada v Attorney General of Canada (“MAC v Canada”), the Muslim Association of Canada (“MAC”) challenged an audit by RAD of the CRA due to allegations it was supporting terrorist organizations.89 MAC is a registered charity with more than 150,000 members that operates mosques, schools and community centres across Canada.90 Being registered as a charity is essential for the operation of MAC because it relies on donations, and as a charity, it has the ability to write tax receipts for donors which a major incentive for donors.91
MAC brought forth a Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenge under sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), and 15, for the right to freedom of religion, expression, association and discrimination and sought a remedy to have the audit terminated.92 The audit was conducted by the CRA’s RAD to determine if its charitable status should be revoked. MAC argued that RAD’s audit process had an anti-Islamic bias, noting that since 2008, 12 out of the 14 charitable status revocations by the CRA were related to Muslim charities.93
The Court allowed the audit to continue by declining to make a decision on the grounds that the application was premature.94 Sympathizing with MAC, the Court wrote, “I ask myself whether a Christian or Jewish charity would have its charitable status revoked for similar infractions or whether they would receive some sort of guideline, warning, reprimand or other sanction short of revocation of charitable status.”95 When risk factors of terrorist financing are present, a charity does not often receive the benefit of the doubt but becomes engaged in an antagonistic auditing process. This treats the charity like a villain when, in reality, they are more often the victim of terrorist exploitation.96
Charities, specifically Muslim-led, are not given the benefit of doubt and face greater bias when being audited under the current risk assessment regulations by the CRA and RAD. The current legislation presents a strong discriminatory bias against Middle Eastern and Muslim charities, as they face greater scrutiny, receive fewer donations, and individuals fear possible repercussions, which leads to reduced humanitarian aid.
(c) Administrative Burdens
The third factor contributing to the chill effect on charitable donations is the administrative burden and higher compliance costs. The current regulatory framework requires a high degree of due diligence and adherence to standards established by the CRA and the PCMLTFA to help ensure that charities do not fund terrorist organizations.97 Fulfilling this framework also incurs higher costs for the charity. For example, these costs may arise from record-keeping requirements, financial audits, and the legal fees associated with ensuring compliance to the regulatory standards. The high degree of burdens becomes a major contributor to the chill effect, leading to fewer donations reaching the intended target. Charities then either choose not to donate to an area or are forced to withdraw due to compliance requirements and the associated burden.
For example, an American named Omar Abdi Mohamed ran a small Muslim charity, the Western Somali Relief Agency, to support refugees.98 This charity did not have extensive overhead, personnel, or expertise, and once the charity received donations, the funds were sent to a money transfer agent for distribution.99 Omar’s charity would not likely comply with the guidelines established in the US and Canada, as he is unable to determine who received the funds. There is an additional issue that the intended recipients are refugees in Ethiopia who are transient and may not have the ability to fulfill record-keeping obligations when receiving the funds.100
In Canada, if the funds from Omar’s charity were going to an area, such as Somalia, under the Criminal Code section 83.032 authorization exemption, it would not meet the standard for many reasons. The first is the lack of overall due diligence conducted, second, there are not enough risk mitigation steps taken, which is evident through the use of the intermediary to send the funds. Finally, it became difficult to determine if the funds reached a terrorist organization.
The record-keeping, identity verification, and reporting requirements for suspicious transactions that would apply to Omar’s charity and other charities alike are set out in Part 1 of the PCMLTFA, which provides guidance for reporting entities. As well, the CRA provides guidance on how to protect a charity through governance and accountability, financial control and management, risk, fraud and aid diversion mitigation, and transparent reporting and record keeping.101 Ensuring that the requirements of the CRA are met creates a burdensome framework that can be costly to ensure compliance. These would require significant human resources and operational costs that many charities would be unable to meet and would reduce the amount of funds that can be used for actual charitable goals.102
This would also disproportionately affect smaller charities that do not have the resources to fulfill the requirements.103 It is important for charities to have internal due diligence procedures to prevent exploitation by terrorist organizations, and larger charities with the resources can maintain high levels of due diligence, ensuring they are better protected. Smaller charities may be unable to meet these standards and become targeted by terrorist organizations as it becomes easier to divest funds from them.104 Excessively burdensome administrative requirements may prevent the charitable activities that it aims to protect from occurring in the first place.
(d) De-Risking
Banks’ de-risking is the final contributing factor to the potential chill effect on charitable donations due to the current Canadian regulatory framework. The term “de-risking” occurs when financial banks remove themselves from existing relationships because they determine the relationship is too high risk, unprofitable, or simply “complex.”105 Banks choosing to de-risk and remove themselves from interacting with charities is often a result of the stringent regulations.
More specifically, banks’ de-risking disproportionately affects charities because of their work transferring money overseas and their operations in conflict zones.106 Muslim charities are the most impacted as they are perceived to carry a greater risk.107 According to a survey by the Muslim Charities Forum in the UK, 37 percent of respondents said they had difficulty opening a bank account, particularly when their work involved humanitarian aid in conflict zones.108 This illustrates how the chill effect can negatively impact charitable giving.
Financial institutions may outright terminate the relationship, restrict access to certain financial services, or take much longer to process financial requests.109 For example, in 2014, in the United Kingdom, Ummah Welfare Trust, which had an annual turnover of about $39 million, had its account abruptly terminated by HSBC Bank.110 The charity primarily operated in the Middle East and Asia, which includes Syria and Gaza.111 When a charity experiences interruptions in its financing due to the de-risking of financial institutions, there can be serious humanitarian repercussions because much of the work these charities conduct is highly time-sensitive. When there are arbitrary bank closures or an inability to open accounts, there is a risk of forcing financial flows underground, as charities face pressure to provide timely humanitarian aid.112 This reduces financial transparency and the ability to identify and take action against terrorist financing abuses.113
In instances where charities turn to alternative methods of providing financial aid without banks, they become far more vulnerable to terrorist abuse. When banks begin taking steps to de-risk due to stringent regulations, it has the opposite effect of the goal of preventing terrorism. A stringent terrorist financing regime can cause financial institutions to mitigate risk by cutting ties and de-risking charities operating in high-risk zones, which is one of the major drawbacks of increased legislation.
The smaller organizations in conflict zones that require support are the ones most affected by the chill, because they often lack the resources to meet higher financial reporting standards. As a result, Canadian charities are forced to decline to provide support to these organizations overseas due to potential criminal liability. When implementing regulatory regimes on terrorist financing, countries should consider the potential impact on legitimate charitable activities and limit them to what is necessary.
4.4. Current Application
(a) Palestine
The current framework surrounding anti-terrorist financing can be applied to the recent civil conflict between Palestine and Israel. The conflict between Palestine and Israel dates back to the 1948 Arab Israeli War, although the recent conflict began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel.114
Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya (Hamas) is a radical Islamist-nationalist group listed as a terrorist organization by the Canadian government.115 In 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections, and in 2007, Hamas overthrew the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip to seize power of the territory.116
The conflict has continued since the October 7, 2023, attack, with devastating effects. There have been roughly 5.9 million Palestinians registered with the UN as refugees, and according to the Hamas-run health ministry, over 67,000 people have died.117 The need for humanitarian aid during this war is at a level almost unprecedented. As United Nations experts have stated, there is a “worst-case scenario of famine currently playing out.”118
The legal issue arises when charities attempt to provide humanitarian aid to Palestine because the state is under the authority of Hamas, a registered terrorist organization. Under section 83.02 of the Criminal Code, every person is guilty of an offence who directly or indirectly provides property knowing that it will be used in part to carry out a terrorist activity.119 This creates a grey area in the context of Palestine because any supplies or financial humanitarian aid that is provided to the area, Hamas is likely to benefit, even through the collection of taxes.120 Therefore, anyone who provides aid to the area would be in violation of section 83.02.
This creates the reality for charities where they must rely on either the Authorization Regime or the Humanitarian Assistance exception under Bill C-41.121 Both of these exceptions allow operation in territories controlled by terrorist organizations.
While this may appear to be a saving grace, in practice, these exceptions are overly burdensome and create a chill effect on charitable donations. The applications for both processes have very stringent compliance requirements and a limited scope. This means that some charities that wish to provide support to Palestine and could be a successful applicant may not apply for the exemption in the first place.122 Additionally, if the charity is granted the exemption, in order to maintain its charitable status, the CRA requires the charity to keep detailed books and records concerning all aspects of the exemption in accordance with the books and record requirements in section 230(2) of the Income Tax Act.123
The requirements may have a chilling effect on charitable giving, as charities might choose not to provide aid to Palestine due to fears of criminal liability, failure to meet exemption criteria, or concerns about losing their charitable status. Areas like Palestine, which are in desperate need of foreign aid, often struggle to receive it promptly. While protecting national security is important, this is one of the costs of maintaining strict requirements, where the disadvantages may outweigh the benefits.
(b) Iran War
Another recent example is the war in Iran that began on February 28, 2026, where over 3,500 people have already perished.124 The conflict began after missile strikes hit an Iranian school, which was believed to have been carried out by American forces.125 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the conflict has caused up to 3.2 million Iranians to become temporarily displaced, which presents a massive need for humanitarian aid in the country.126
Canadian charities may face similar difficulties in providing humanitarian aid to the country for reasons very similar to Palestine, as it may be argued that the territory is led by a terrorist organization. Charities may violate section 83.02 of the Criminal Code should they attempt to provide aid.127 The Palestine case presents more of a definitive example, as Hamas is the authoritative regime in Palestine and is a listed terrorist organization by the Canadian government.128 This fulfills the requirement of a “terrorist controlled area.” On the other hand, the Iran case falls into a grey area because the authoritative regime in the controlled area is not a listed terrorist organization eligible for the Authorization Regime or Humanitarian Assistance Exceptions.
However, not all terrorist organizations are “listed entities” by the Canadian government as per the definition of a “terrorist group” in section 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code.129 The Criminal Code provides greater guidance for the exception in section 83.032(2), where a terrorist group controls a geographic area if it exerts sufficient influence over the area, such that carrying out an activity or service a reasonable person would expect the terrorist organization to benefit.130
In the case of Iran, the government may not be a listed terrorist organization, although it could be argued to fall within the definition. Since 2012, the Canadian government has listed the Islamic Republic of Iran as a State Supporter of Terrorism and in 2022 designated the leadership of Iran inadmissible in Canada for their engagement in terrorism and human rights violations.131 While the Iranian authority is not directly listed as a terrorist entity, it has listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has been associated with Iran and helped advance their interests and foreign policy.132 Iran also leads the “Axis of Resistance,” which is made up of a network of listed terrorist organizations such as Hamas, the Houthis, and Hizballah.133 This provides support for the argument that the current Iranian regime would be considered a terrorist organization for the purpose of a “terrorist controlled area” for the Authorization Regime or Humanitarian Assistance Exception.
As the Iranian regime would likely be considered a terrorist organization under the exceptions, charities wishing to provide humanitarian aid would likely be able to utilize the existing exceptions, even though it falls within a grey area. Although charities would face similar issues with the chill effect due to the burdens associated with the exceptions. The Iranian conflict is one that continues to evolve and is a situation that should be monitored as facts change, which may impact the example provided above.
4.5. Bill C-41 Analysis
On the face, it appears that Bill C-41 resolves the issue of charities being able to provide aid in high-risk areas, without being open to criminal liability for providing finances to a terrorist organization. However, Bill C-41 continues to fall short because the requirements for the exceptions are incredibly burdensome. This creates a chill effect as charities may opt out of applying for the exceptions.
Reporting requirements under the exception may create unnecessary barriers for charities that wish to use it. For example, one of the requirements under the Humanitarian Assistance Exception in section 83.03(4) calls upon charities to ensure that they have been “using reasonable efforts to minimize any benefit to terrorist groups.”134 What is considered “reasonable efforts” remains a grey area in how stringent the CRA will be in this regard.135
If a charity wishes to pursue either the Authorization Regime or the Humanitarian Assistance Exception, it will often require legal counsel to ensure compliance and navigate the applicable requirements. This not only increases the costs to the charity, creating another barrier, but also adds to the potential chill effect on charitable giving.
4.6. Synthesis
There is a clear necessity and benefit to having strong anti-terrorist financing laws. These include preventing terrorist organizations from exploiting charities, protecting national security, and maintaining public trust in charities. However, one of the key limiting factors behind any anti-terrorist financing regime with the goal of preventing terrorism is the reality that many individual acts of terrorism are often carried out by lone actors, already working with marginal budgets. This means that financial regulation may provide marginal impacts and even provide a false sense of security for preventing terrorism.
Implementing stricter anti-terrorist financing legislation may overreach and do more harm than intended, as it introduces greater costs. The degree to which charities face discrimination biases disproportionately affects Middle Eastern and Muslim charities. Further, when viewed cumulatively, the costs associated with stricter legislation may outweigh the benefits of greater security. The increased administrative burdens from reporting requirements create higher expenditures for charities, contributing to the chill effect. As charities decide to reduce aid to high-risk areas or receive fewer donations from the public, the unintended consequences of the legislation may become evident. This displays that the costs outweigh the benefits and there are diminishing returns to stricter legislation.
5. Conclusion
As Canadian anti-terrorism laws seek to prevent terrorist financing, the current high degree of stringency produces a chilling effect on legitimate charitable donations. The limits of the current framework are evident in practice through the numerous costs. The legislation enacted to prevent terrorism and promote humanitarian aid often has the opposite effect due to the unintended consequences of the regulation. These unintended consequences, for example, may include the chill effect on Bill C-41, as charities do not apply for exemptions due to the high level of compliance requirements. Another example is when the stringent reporting requirements cause banks to de-risk, forcing charities to turn to alternative methods of sending financial support, which only increases their risk of terrorist exploitation.
While preventing terrorist financing remains an essential objective, excessively stringent regulations risk undermining legitimate charitable activity. There should be a more balanced approach that protects charities while targeting genuine terrorist financing, which may better serve both security and humanitarian goals.
Additionally, leading members of the anti-terrorist financing regime, such as the CRA’s RAD, should provide greater support to charities to ensure they maintain compliance, rather than creating an adversarial process. The marginal benefit of the stringent legislation does not outweigh the costs. The decrease in humanitarian aid may be far greater than the benefit of preventing a marginal degree of terrorism. In conclusion, the cure would be worse than the disease.
Endnotes
1 Rodger Shanahan, “Charities and terrorism: Lessons from the Syrian Crisis” (2018), online (pdf): [Shanahan].
2 Samantha Bricknell et al., “Money laundering and terrorism financing risks to Australian non-profit organizations” (2011) Australian Institute of Criminology, online (pdf): at 9 [Bricknell].
3 Ibid at iii.
4 Emilio Abiusi, “Villains or Victims? Analyzing the Canada Revenue Agency’s Role in Countering Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Offences in Canadian Charities” (2025) 30 Appeal: Review of Current Law and Law Reform 115 [Abiusi].
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid at 121.
7 Mark Blumberg, “Key statistics on Canada’s charity and non-profit sector 2023” (13 January 2023), online: Blumbergs Canadian Charity Law.
8 Jonathon Penny, “Understanding Chilling Effects” (2021) 106:1451 Minnesota Law Review, online (pdf): at 1454 [Penny].
9 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 83.01(1)(b) [Criminal Code].
10 Ibid, s 83.02.
11 Ibid, s 83.08(1).
12 FATF, “BPP-Combating the Terrorist Financing Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations“ (2023), online (pdf): at 7 [FATF].
13 Public Safety Canada, “Remembering Air India Flight 182” (2023), online.
14 Kent Roach, “The Air India Report and the Regulation of Charities and Terrorist Financing” (2011) 61 U Toronto L J 45 at 46 [Roach].
15 Ibid at 47.
16 Ibid at 45.
17 Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, “Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy”, vol 1 (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 2010), online (pdf).
19 Roach, supra note 14 at 47.
20 Bill C-36, “An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the registration of charities in order to combat terrorism”, 1st Sess, 37th Parl, 2001 (assented to 18 December 2001).
21 Criminal Code, supra note 9 s 83.01; Roach, supra note 14 at 48.
22 Roach, supra note 14 at 48.
23 Ibid.
24 Terrance Carter et al., “Minister of public safety publishes guidance on criminal code exceptions when providing aid in areas controlled by terrorist groups” (27 June 2024) AML/ATF and Charity Law Alert No. 54, online (pdf) at 1 [Carter].
25 Criminal Code, supra note 9 s 83.02.
26 Carter, supra note 24 at 4.
27 Bill C-41, “An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts”, 1st Sess, 44th Parl, 2023 (assented to 20 June 2023).
28 Carter, supra note 24 at 1.
29 Criminal Code, supra note 9, s 83.03(3).
30 Ibid, s 83.032(1).
31 Carter, supra note 24 at 5.
32 Ibid at 5-6.
33 Ibid at 6.
34 Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, SC 2000, c 17 [PCMLTFA].
35 Criminal Code, supra note 8.
36 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [ITA].
37 Charities Registration (Securities Information) Act, SC 2001, c 41 [CRSI].
38 Department of Finance Canada, “Canada’s Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime Strategy 2023-2026” (2023), online (pdf): at 8 [ATF Regime].
39 PCMLTFA, supra note 33, Part 1.
40 Criminal Code, supra note 9 ss 83.01, 83.02 and 83.08(1).
41 Government of Canada, “Charities – Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) Summary – Review and Analysis Division” (2022), online.
42 ATF Regime, supra note 38 at 29.
43 CRSI, supra note 37, s 2(1).
44 ATF Regime, supra note 38 at 17; ITA, supra note 36, s 168 (3.1).
45 Department of Finance, “2025 Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks in Canada” (2025) at 15.
46 Ibid at 25.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid at 12.
49 Ibid at 13.
50 Ibid at 24.
51 Government of Canada, “Checklist: how to protect your charity against terrorist abuse” (2024), online. [CRA Checklist].
52 Ibid.
53 Canada Revenue Agency, “Assessing and reducing terrorist risks to charities” (2025), online.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Shanahan, supra note 1 at 2.
64 Ibid at 3.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid at 5.
67 Roach, supra note 14 at 47.
68 Ibid at 50.
69 Ibid at 49.
70 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report” (2004), online (pdf) at 382.
71 Roach, supra note 14 at 49.
72 Ibid; Jordan Freidman, “Today marks 11th anniversary of 2004 Madrid Terrorist Attack” (11 March 2015), online: 9/11 Memorial & Museum.
73 ATF Regime, supra note 38 at 12.
74 Roach, supra note 14 at 50.
75 Penny, supra note 8 at 1454.
76 Sam Adelsberg et al., “The Chilling Effect of the Material Support Law on Humanitarian Aid: Causes, Consequences, and Proposed Reforms” (2013) 4:2 Harv Nat’l Sec J 282 at 294-295 [Adelsberg].
77 Carter, supra note 24 at 1; Criminal Code, supra note 9, ss 83.01 and 83.02.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid at 2.
80 Joshua Hersh, “Somalia Famine: Aid Groups Say U.S. Anti-Terror Laws are Still Holding Them Back” (18 August 2011), online: Huffington Post.
81 Ibid.
82 Adelsberg, supra note 76 at 296.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid at 51.
86 Adelsberg, supra note 76 at 294.
87 Ibid at 295.
88 Ibid.
89 Muslim Association of Canada v Attorney General of Canada, 2023 ONSC 5171.
90 Ibid at para 6.
91 Ibid at para 8.
92 Ibid at para 10.
93 Ibid at para 25.
94 Ibid at para 95.
95 Ibid at para 55.
96 Abiusi, supra note 4 at 110.
97 Kathryn A Ruff, “Scared to Donate: An Examination of the Effects of Designating Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the First Amendment Rights of Muslim Donors” (2005) 9:1 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol’y 447 at 497 [Ruff].
98 Ibid at 497-498.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 CRA Checklist, supra note 50.
102 Ibid.
103 Shanahan, supra note 1 at 9.
104 Ibid.
105 Tracey Durner & Liat Shetret, “Understanding Bank De-risking and Its Effects on Financial Inclusion” (November 2015), online (pdf): “Global Center on Cooperative Security” at 5 [Durner].
106 Ibid at 9.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 FATF, supra note 12 at 35.
110 Durner, supra note 105 at 20.
111 Ibid.
112 FATF, supra note 12 at 35.
113 Ibid.
114 BBC News, “Israel and the Palestinians: History of the conflict explained” (14 October 2025), online: [Palestine Conflict].
115 Public Safety Canada, “Current listed entities: HAMAS” (4 June 2021), online: [Hamas].
116 Ibid.
117 Palestine Conflict, supra note 113.
118 Ibid.
119 Criminal Code, supra note 9, s 83.02.
120 Carter, supra note 24 at 4.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid; ITA, supra note 36, s 230(2).
124 Nayera Abdallah & Menna Alaaeldin, “How many people have been killed in the Iran War?” (6 April 2026), online: The Japan Times.
125 Chris Osuh, “Iran war timeline: civilians bear brunt of US and Israel’s weeks-long campaign” (22 March 2026), online: The Guardian.
126 Ayaki Ito, “UNHCR: Up to 3.2 million Iranians temporarily displaced in Iran as conflict intensifies” (12 March 2026), online: UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency.
127 Criminal Code, supra note 9, s 83.02.
128 Hamas, supra note 114.
129 Criminal Code, supra note 9, s 83.01(1).
130 Ibid, s 83.032(2).
131 Government of Canada, “Canada’s response to the Islamic Republic of Iran” (19 June 2024), online.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Carter, supra note 24 at 21.
135 Ibid.