

**Supreme Court of Canada
Appointment Process**

CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION



March 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PREFACE.....	i
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CBA POSITION.....	2
III. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.....	4
IV. PROPOSED PROCESS - ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SUPREME COURT OF CANADA APPOINTMENTS	5
V. CRITERIA FOR APPOINTMENT.....	7
VI. COMPARISON OF APPOINTMENTS PROCESS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.....	7
i. US Style Confirmation Hearings.....	7
ii. United Kingdom	9
iii. Australia	10
iv. New Zealand.....	11
VII. CONCLUSION.....	12

VIII. APPENDICES

1. Letter to the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P., March 8, 2004.
2. Letter to the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P., March 8, 2004.
3. Recommendations of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Appointment of Judges in Canada, August 1985.

PREFACE

The Canadian Bar Association is a national association representing 38,000 jurists, including lawyers, notaries, law teachers and students across Canada. The Association's primary objectives include improvement in the law and in the administration of justice.

This submission was prepared with assistance from the Legislation and Law Reform Directorate at the National Office and has been approved as a public statement of the Canadian Bar Association.

Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process

I. INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Bar Association (CBA) welcomes the review of the appointment process to the Supreme Court of Canada. Independence of the judiciary from the executive and legislative branches is a cornerstone of our system of government and, by extension, of Canadian democracy itself.

Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada must be made as a result of an established, well-known and understood advisory process in order to facilitate the selection of the best candidates.

The CBA supports an open and transparent process for judicial appointments based solely on merit, and ultimately representative of the diversity of society as a whole.

The principles of judicial independence – accessibility, expertise, representativeness, efficiency and fairness – are essential to a well-functioning and highly respected judicial system. The selection process for judges must be objective and should remove any perception of political bias. It is the CBA's position that a Parliamentary review of candidates should not play a role in the selection or appointment of Supreme Court judges. Candidates should not be subjected to a congressional type process of public examination and review. This would politicize the appointment process and detract from the principle of the independence of the judiciary.

The CBA is strongly opposed to any system which would expose judges to Parliamentary criticism of their judgments, or cross-examination on their beliefs or preferences or judicial

opinions, or any measure which would give to Canadians the mistaken impression that the judicial branch answers to the legislative branch.

II. BACKGROUND TO THE CBA POSITION

The CBA has long been concerned about ensuring the integrity of the judicial appointments process. In 1984, the CBA established the *Committee on The Appointment of Judges in Canada* (the McKelvey Committee). The committee issued its report (the McKelvey Report) in 1985.¹

The McKelvey Report found widespread dissatisfaction with the method of judicial selection and concluded that the appointments system then in place was not designed to select the best potential judges. It found that, although the quality of the Canadian judiciary was good, it was uneven, and that some of the more evident weaknesses flowed from patronage appointments.

The committee identified several specific flaws in the appointments process:

- Insufficient public knowledge about the process;
- Public perception of too much political influence;
- In some provinces, the excessive role played by political considerations in appointments;
- The overly influential role played by regional ministers in the federal appointments process;
- The problems associated with allowing one person – a minister’s special adviser, often someone relatively inexperienced – to be responsible for collecting information on which the Minister bases appointments decisions;
- Lack of consistency in developing a true consultation process between the Minister of Justice, Attorneys-General and Chief Justices of the various provinces;
- In most cases, inadequate data on prospects for section 96 appointments;
- Insufficient checking with provincial law societies about the professional standing of prospective judges;

- Frequently, too long a delay in appointing judges; and
- Some evidence of uneven competence on the Bench.

The McKelvey Report acknowledged that the political process was necessarily part of the judicial appointments process, since there was no practical alternative to it. However, it made twenty-seven recommendations to improve the process, covering federal, provincial and territorial judicial appointments, advisory committees on judicial appointments, training and conditions of employment.

On the issues of patronage and the perception of bias, the McKelvey Report concluded that Parliament should not play a role in the selection or appointment of federal judges. It is neither necessary nor desirable for the legislative branch to be involved. It is contrary to the Canadian tradition for the appointment of judges to be subjected to a congressional-type process of public examination and review. The McKelvey Report rejected the U.S. system of the election of judges or Senate review, in part because of the “virtual inquisition” into candidates’ private affairs.

In 1986, the CBA called for the creation of non-partisan advisory committees², with representatives from the public, the legal profession, the judiciary and governments. Nominations or suggestions of candidates for appointment as judges should be encouraged from a wide variety of sources. Advisory committees are now in place for superior and provincial courts throughout Canada.³ These advisory committees are working well and are recognized internationally. The CBA had also recommended that this advisory process apply to Supreme Court of Canada appointments, but this recommendation was not implemented.

In 1987, the CBA expressed concern about the potential for political patronage under the appointments system proposed for the Supreme Court of Canada in the Meech Lake Accord.⁴ The Accord would have the provinces submit lists of candidates from which the federal

2 CBA Resolution 86-08-M.

3 For example, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs and Ontario Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee.

4 CBA Resolution 87-03-A.

government would select appointees. The CBA noted that this method for selecting judges was too susceptible to political influence and stalemate, and might not result in the appointment of the most highly qualified candidates. The CBA urged the federal and provincial governments to reconsider the process of selection of judges for the Supreme Court provided in the Meech Lake Accord. It called again on the government to adopt the CBA's recommendations on the appointment of judges.

III. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

Ensuring the continued independence of the judiciary is fundamental to any proposals for the appointment process of Supreme Court judges. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in *Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island*,⁵ judicial independence protects citizens against the abuse of state power. It also is an integral component of federalism, protecting one level of government from encroachment into its jurisdiction by another.

In the *P.E.I. Reference*, the Court reiterated that judicial independence is comprised of three essential aspects: security of tenure; financial security, and administrative independence. Security of tenure and financial security have two dimensions, protecting both individual judges and the courts as an institution. The institutional dimension is important, as it underscores the position of the courts as guardians of the Constitution, the rule of law, equality and the democratic process. It reflects a deep commitment in Canadian society to the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive and legislature.

It is now well recognized that the courts in Canada enjoy constitutional protection for the independence of its judiciary.⁶ In *P.E.I. Reference*, Lamer C.J., writing for the majority, stated:

⁵ *P.E.I. Reference*, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.

⁶ Peter W. Hogg, *Constitutional Law of Canada*, Volume 1, 2002 Edition, p. 7-14.5

Independence of the judiciary implies not only that a judge should be free from executive or legislative encroachment and from political pressures and entanglements but also that he should be removed from the financial or business entanglements likely to affect or rather to seem to affect him in the exercise of his judicial functions.⁷

In the same judgment, Lamer C.J. discussed the character of the relationship between the legislature and the executive and the judiciary. He concluded that these relationships should be “depoliticized” and that the legislature and the executive cannot, and cannot appear to, exert political pressure on the judiciary.⁸

In its 2000 submission to the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, the CBA argued:

Now that politicians’ attacks on judges have become an unfortunate part of the political landscape, Committee hearings could become a forum for those who have an axe to grind with respect to particular judicial decisions or with the judiciary generally. In particular, we are concerned that some will feel the need to make direct links between judicial decisions, either specifically or generally, and compensation issues. We believe the Commission should caution Parliament that its consideration of the Commission’s report involves special constitutional considerations, which risk being endangered by a politicized approach and by making any links between judges’ remuneration and the decisions they make.⁹

IV. PROPOSED PROCESS - ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SUPREME COURT OF CANADA APPOINTMENTS

On March 8, 2004, the CBA wrote to the Prime Minister urging that appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada be made following an established, well-known and understood advisory process in order to facilitate selection of the best candidate.¹⁰ When Canadians understand how Supreme Court judges are appointed, their confidence in the system will be that much higher.

Canadians expect, and are entitled to have, judges who are well qualified, independent, and perceived to be independent of political influence. The identification and assessment of

7 at para 130.

8 at para 140.

9 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Committee: , Submission on Judges’ Salaries and Benefits, 2000.

10 Letter to the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Paul Martin, P.C. M.P., March 8, 2004.

candidates for superior and appellate courts has been greatly improved with more formalized review by advisory committees in each province and territory. In our view, this process could usefully be brought to bear on appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada.

In another letter to the Prime Minister on March 8, 2004, the CBA suggested the following proposal for Supreme Court appointments:

You would appoint a Special Advisory Committee each time a vacancy occurs on the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). The Committee would be structured similarly to the existing federal judicial appointments advisory committees, drawing from the legal community and the public. It would be composed of representatives of the federal Minister of Justice, and of the Attorney General, Chief Justice and law society in the jurisdiction or jurisdictions from which the candidate would be selected. The national President of the Canadian Bar Association would also be a member. The Committee structure would differ from the existing model by the inclusion of four Parliamentarians, elected from and by the membership of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. The Special Advisory Committee would make recommendations to you. It would be bound by the confidentiality of the current advisory committee process that has served Canada well and must be preserved.¹¹

The proposal has several advantages:

- It responds to the goal of involving Parliamentarians in the appointment process.
- It reflects the unique nature of the Supreme Court of Canada as Canada's court of last resort. While all judges in Canada make law, the lower court judges, including those of the courts of appeal, are bound by precedent differently than the Supreme Court of Canada. Their scope for law-making is therefore more restricted than the Supreme Court of Canada's, and their decisions are subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in any case. The public interest in Parliamentary involvement in the judicial appointment process is therefore most effectively placed at the Supreme Court of Canada level.
- It adds Parliamentary involvement in the process without losing or compromising the integrity of the current system for lower courts, which works well, has resulted in excellent appointments and is held out as a model internationally.
- It complements full transparency regarding the criteria and process for the Supreme Court of Canada.

V. CRITERIA FOR APPOINTMENT

Over the years, the CBA identified the essential qualities for men and women being considered for judicial appointment:¹²

- High moral character
- Human qualities: sympathy, generosity, charity, patience
- Experience in the law
- Intellectual and judgmental ability
- Good health and good work habits
- Bilingualism, if required by the nature of the post

The Supreme Court of Canada must continue to be representative of the regions and legal systems of Canada. The CBA supports the appointment of bilingual judges, and encourages affirmative-action policies for appointing women and members of minority groups to the Bench.

These criteria and others are considered by the advisory committees in determining the merit of judicial candidates.¹³

VI. COMPARISON OF APPOINTMENTS PROCESS IN OTHER COUNTRIES

i. U.S. Style Confirmation Hearings

In the US, federal judges are appointed by the President, with Senate approval, for terms of “good behaviour”. The main federal tribunals are the Supreme Court of the U.S., the Courts of Appeal and certain District Courts exercising federal jurisdiction only. There are also several specialized tribunals. No explicit qualifications for judges are set out in the U.S. Constitution. The President can appoint any lawyer for whom Senatorial

¹² McKelvey Report and CBA Resolution 86-08-M.

¹³ Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs: Assessment criteria: http://www.fja.gc.ca/jud_app/guide/assess_e.html.

confirmation can be obtained. The McKelvey Report found that the U.S. style confirmation process draws the harshest criticism in Canada. At a confirmation hearing in the U.S., potential judicial candidates can be subject to an “intensive grilling” by the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning their views on current social and political questions. The Senators’ prying into candidates’ private lives can amount to a virtual inquisition, especially if the political complexion of the committee differs from that of the candidate.

The McKelvey Report was concerned that public confirmation hearings similar to the U.S. by a Parliamentary Committee risked politicizing of the process and could deter prospective judges from putting their names forward. A U.S. type confirmatory process seeks to predetermine how a prospective judge would decide cases. With the advent of the *Charter* and the increase in judicial consideration of socio-political issues, there were increased concerns that political influence could impact on the appointment of judges.

The CBA is strongly opposed to any system which would expose judges to Parliamentary criticism of their judgments, or cross-examination on their beliefs or preferences or judicial opinions, or any measure which would give to Canadians the mistaken impression that the judicial branch answers to the legislative branch.

Additional criticism of the U.S. style confirmation hearings is that they create bias along party partisan lines. According to Lederman¹⁴ “loyalty to the political party in power is given priority over merit pure and simple...”. Lederman, *supra*, indicated that the experience in the US, despite the requirement for Senate ratification of nominees, is that over ninety per cent of the judicial appointments are members of the President’s party.¹⁵

14 *Proposals for the Reform of the Supreme Court* (1979) Vol. 57, Canadian Bar Review, at page 698.

15 Citing Glenn R. Winters: *American Appointments, Proposals and Problems* (1967) 1 Can. Leg. Studies 253.

ii. United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is considering far-reaching legislative changes in the *Constitutional Reform Bill*. The Bill would replace the office of Lord Chancellor, and establish a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords would be abolished. A Judicial Committee would be created relating to the appointments of judges.

It is significant that the U.K. government, in its consultation paper, did not seriously consider the federal appointment process in the U.S.:

There are no constitutional or federal requirements to be a federal judge. The American constitution simply provides for the President to appoint Judges of the Supreme Court with the advice and consent of the Senate. Congress has applied the same selection procedure to the federal appellate and trial courts. Due to the pivotal role played by the legislature, appointment arrangements at federal level are not relevant to the issues raised in this consultation and are not discussed further here.¹⁶ (Emphasis added)

Rather, the U.K. government consultation paper looked more closely at the U.S. State-level “Merit Plans” or “Merit Commissions”:

The use of Commissions (often called Merit Plans or Merit Commissions) by U.S. states to select candidates for appointment by the state Executive has arisen as a result of growing criticism of direct popular election of judges, which has traditionally been seen as the prevailing method of appointment. Merit Plans are so called because of their aim to shift the balance of selection on to a candidate's merit rather than his or her social or political affiliations, or financial means to run an election campaign, which some see as a major shortfall of elective appointments.¹⁷ (Emphasis added)

The U.K. studied the process in Canada, citing that for some time the approach to the appointment of the judiciary was similar to England and Wales. They noted Canada’s use of advisory committees for the appointment of judges:

Canada has, in recent years, begun to adopt the use of advisory Commissions in an attempt to provide greater openness and wider participation after criticisms of what were viewed as a series of overtly party-political appointments in the mid-1980s.¹⁸

¹⁶ A Department for Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper *Constitutional reform: a new way of appointing judges*, July 2003: <http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/jacommission/index.htm#part4>.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

The approach adopted at the provincial court level in Canada was also considered and the Ontario Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee (JAAC) “is generally cited as a model example.”¹⁹ (Emphasis added)

In the U.K., with the advent of the *European Convention on Human Rights*, the role of the judiciary has expanded with the coming into force of their *Human Rights Act 1998*.²⁰ The U.K. recognized the expanded role of the judiciary and concluded “[i]f the judiciary is to be seen and trusted as independent of the government of the day, it must be appointed by a process which must be seen to be open and independent.”²¹ The U.K. consultation document states judicial independence will be bolstered by the creation of an independent Judicial Appointments Commission.²²

iii. Australia

The High Court of Australia is the final court of appeal for both federal and state courts. The Chief Justice and six other judges are appointed by the Governor-General. The Attorney-General is required to consult with the Attorneys-General of the states before an appointment is made to the High Court.²³ In essence, the appointments are made by cabinet on the recommendation of the Attorney-General.

The Law Council of Australia developed a policy on the appointment of judges²⁴ that would apply to all levels of court except the High Court of Australia. The High Court of Australia was excluded because it is already subject to a statutory requirement for consultation. The Law Council policy affirmed that the judicial appointments should be a function of the Executive. It

19 *Ibid.*

20 Chapter 42.

21 *A Department for Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper Constitutional reform: a new way of appointing judges*, July 2003: <http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/jacommission/index.htm#part4> at paras 22 and 23.

22 *Ibid.*, para 23.

23 Section 6, *High Court of Australia Act 1979*.

24 Law Council of Australia: *Policy on the process of Judicial appointments*, March 16, 2002.

also emphasized that apart from the statutory criteria, the sole criteria for judicial appointment should be merit. The policy established a formal Judicial Appointment Protocol.²⁵

iv. New Zealand

In New Zealand, in most cases, the Attorney-General formally recommends the appointment of members of the judiciary to the Governor-General. The present major exceptions are the Chief Justice, whose appointment is made on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and Maori Land Court Judges, whose appointments are made on the recommendation of the Minister of Maori Affairs.²⁶

To ensure greater transparency in the process, advertising for expressions of interest in judicial positions is carried out at all levels except the Court of Appeal.²⁷ The Solicitor General of New Zealand acknowledged that the appointment process in New Zealand had evolved to the extent that it is “more formalized, more consultative and a little more transparent.”²⁸ The Solicitor General noted that there is a wide gathering of suggestions and nominations for appointment and that there are detailed discussions as to the suitability of various candidates.

The concept of an independent commission to make judicial appointments was rejected in a report prepared in 2002 for the government by the law firm Chen Palmer & Partners.²⁹ The report recommended that this power remain with the Executive, and that a new Judicial Appointments and Liaison Office be established to manage a process for supporting the Attorney-General in making high quality appointments of judges, other judicial officers and quasi-judicial appointments. The government accepted the broad basis of the

²⁵ The policy generated considerable interest in Australia. It, however, is not binding on the Federal, State or Territorial governments.

²⁶ Also note the recent developments in New Zealand. The Supreme Court Act 2003 establishes the Supreme Court of New Zealand. The Act establishes within New Zealand a new court of final appeal comprising New Zealand judges. For appeals from New Zealand, the Supreme Court of New Zealand replaces the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council located in the United Kingdom, and came into being on 1 January 2004, with hearings to commence on 1 July 2004. Section 17 of the Supreme Court Act states that the Supreme Court comprises the Chief Justice and not fewer than four nor more than five other judges, appointed by the Governor General as Judges of the Supreme Court: Source: <http://www.justice.govt.nz>.

²⁷ <http://www.justice.govt.nz>.

²⁸ Terence Arnold: In a speech made to the New Zealand Bar Association, Judicial Appointments, August 2003: <http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/uploads/JudicialAppointments.PDF>.

²⁹ Barristers & Solicitors, Public Law Specialists, New Zealand, *Judicial Administration Issues*, November 1, 2002.

recommendations as reflected in the *Judicial Matters Bill* presently before the New Zealand Parliament.

In recent reviews of the judicial appointment process in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, none of these jurisdictions have opted to go the route of the U.S. style confirmation hearings process.

VII. CONCLUSION

The principles of judicial independence – accessibility, expertise, representativeness, efficiency and fairness – are essential to a well-functioning and highly respected judicial system. CBA supports an open and transparent process for appointments to the Bench based solely on merit, and ultimately representative of the diversity of society as a whole. Appointments must be made as a result of an established, well-known and understood advisory process to facilitate the selection of the best candidate. The CBA does not support a Parliamentary review of candidates as this will politicize the appointment process and detract from the independence of the judiciary.

The CBA has proposed a process for appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada that would meet these criteria. We welcome the opportunity to work with the government on a system to ensure highly qualified judges on the highest court.



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
CABINET DU PRÉSIDENT

March 8, 2004

The Right Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
80 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0A2

Dear Prime Minister,

I write on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association, on the issue of the appointment process for the Supreme Court of Canada. The CBA represents over 38,000 lawyers and other jurists across Canada and is dedicated to the improvement of the law and the administration of justice,

The CBA is greatly concerned that Parliamentary reviews of candidates to become Supreme Court of Canada Judges would pose an unacceptable threat to the independence of our judiciary. We are strongly opposed to the adoption of U.S.-style hearings, which inevitably become heavily politicized. We are strongly opposed to any system which would expose judges to Parliamentary criticism of their judgments, or cross-examination on their beliefs or preferences or judicial opinions, or any measure which would give to Canadians the mistaken impression that the judicial branch answers to the legislative branch. Canada is blessed with perhaps the best and most independent judiciary in the world and that nothing must jeopardize this independence.

The CBA has long been in the forefront of a review of the judicial appointment process. In 1986, the CBA called for the creation of non-partisan advisory committees, with representatives from the public, the legal profession, the judiciary and governments. These committees are now in place for federal appointments to courts throughout Canada. Any system can be improved, and the CBA continues to urge greater transparency in the process by which judges are chosen. In particular, as you have stated on several occasions, the public's need to understand the appointment process must guide the federal government in the finding the best process for nominating Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.

Today, we continue to urge that appointments to the Supreme Court be made following an established, well-known and understood advisory process in order to facilitate selection of the best candidate. When Canadians understand how Supreme Court judges are appointed, their confidence in the system will be that much higher.

Canadians expect, and are entitled to have, judges who are well qualified, independent, and perceived to be independent of political influence. The identification and assessment of candidates for superior and appellate courts has been greatly improved with more formalized review by advisory committees in each province and territory. In our view, this process could usefully be brought to bear on appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada.

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The CBA is ready to assist your government in developing and adopting a process that is transparent and guarantees real and perceived independence of the Canadian judiciary. We would like to meet with you at your earliest convenience to discuss this in greater detail.

Yours truly,



F. William Johnson, Q.C.

cc: The Hon. Reginald Alcock, P.C., M.P. The Hon. David Anderson, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Jean Augustine, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Jacob Austin, P.C., Senator
L'hon. Mauril Bélanger, C.P., député
The Hon. Dr. Carolyn Bennett, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Ethel Blondin-Andrew, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Claudette Bradshaw, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Aileen Carroll, P.C., M.P.
L'hon. Denis Coderre, C.P., député
The Hon. Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. John Efford, P.C., M.P.
L'hon. Liza Frulla, C.P., députée
The Hon. Ralph Goodale, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Bill Graham, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Albina Guarnieri, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Stan Kazmierczak Keyes, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Gar Knutson, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. John McCallum, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Joseph McGuire, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Anne McLellan, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Andrew Mitchell, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Stephen Owen, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Dr. Rey Pagtakhan, P.C., M.P.
L'hon. Denis Paradis, C.P., député
The Hon. James Peterson, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Pierre Pettigrew, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. David Pratt, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Geoff Regan, P.C., M.P.
L'hon. Lucienne Robillard, C.P., députée
L'hon. Jacques Saada, C.P., député
L'hon. Hélène Scherrer, C.P., députée
The Hon. Andy Scott, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Judy Sgro, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Robert Speller, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Tony Valeri, P.C., M.P.
The Hon. Joseph Volpe, P.C., M.P.



March 8, 2004

The Right Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
80 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0A2

Re: Appointment of Supreme Court of Canada Justices

Dear Prime Minister,

Further to my letter addressed to you this morning, I am pleased to offer this suggestion of the Canadian Bar Association regarding the appointment of Supreme Court of Canada justices. You may wish to consider this proposal in light of your deliberations on this matter.

The Proposal

You would appoint a Special Advisory Committee each time a vacancy occurs on the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). The Committee would be structured similarly to the existing federal judicial appointments advisory committees, drawing from the legal community and the public. It would be composed of representatives of the federal Minister of Justice, and of the Attorney General, Chief Justice and law society in the jurisdiction or jurisdictions from which the candidate would be selected. The national President of the Canadian Bar Association would also be a member. The Committee structure would differ from the existing model by the inclusion of four Parliamentarians, elected from and by the membership of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. The Special Advisory Committee would make recommendations to you. It would be bound by the confidentiality of the current advisory committee process that has served Canada well and must be preserved.

.../2

The Rationale

The importance of increased transparency should lie with the process by which Supreme Court of Canada judges are appointed, not with the individual candidates themselves. The potential risk to judicial independence lies with the probing of an individual judge's views and background, not with the process or criteria by which they are considered. The focus should be on how and by what standards candidates are considered. Increasing the public's knowledge of the system so that the method and criteria for appointment are clearly known would go a long way to remedying the current malaise.

In addition, to respond to your commitment to reducing the democratic deficit in the area of SCC appointments, there is a need to include Parliamentarians in the process.

This proposal:

- Responds to your goal of involving Parliamentarians in the SCC appointment process.
- Reflects the unique nature of the SCC as Canada's court of last resort. While all judges in Canada make law and have the potential to be activist or not, the lower court judges, including those of the courts of appeal, are bound by precedent differently than is the SCC. Their scope for law-making is therefore more restricted than is the SCC's, and their decisions are subject to appeal to the SCC in any case. The public interest in Parliamentary involvement in the judicial appointment process is therefore most effectively placed at the SCC level.
- Adds Parliamentary involvement in the process without losing or compromising the integrity of the current system that works well, has resulted in excellent appointments and is held out as a model internationally.
- Complements full transparency regarding the criteria and process for SCC appointments.

I am cognizant that this proposed model may not be the one that you ultimately chose. Please accept the offer of the Canadian Bar Association to assist in the development of this most important decision.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "F. William Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long, sweeping tail.

F. William Johnson, QC

Excerpt from: *The Appointment of Judges in Canada, CBA Committee Report, 1985* (McKelvey Report)

CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Historically all judicial appointments, both federal and provincial, have been made by political decision, usually by the cabinet on the recommendation of the minister of justice. This political process is a necessary part of our system of government, and there is no practical alternative. What we recommend is a selection system that will encourage appointment of the best people to judicial office without changing the responsibility of governments for appointment.

Our report shows that all is not as it should be in appointments to the bench. We are concerned that the public expects - and is entitled to have - judges that are well qualified and perceived to be independent of political influence. The present system of selection and appointments at the federal level is, in several respects, overly dominated by political considerations:

- In most provinces politics plays too important a part in selecting candidates for the bench - in some provinces to the point of abusing the concept of partisanship.
- There have been unseemly political confrontations between the federal government and several provincial governments over who should be appointed to judicial office. These confrontations are not only demeaning to those involved; they also demean the selection and appointment process and, ultimately, all those that hold the office of judge. It is our hope that our suggestions can help governments avoid the situation where certain provinces have refused to cooperate with the federal government and virtually vetoed appointments in an effort to bargain for candidates.
- Some judicial appointments have been made on the eve of a change of government or shortly after a government assumed office with such haste as to give the impression that the political authority acted precipitately without the consideration and care that should be given to selecting the best person for the office of judge.

Unfortunately, the screening process that does exist - through the CBA National Committee on the Judiciary - does not seem to have corrected the situation, although undoubtedly some inappropriate appointments have been prevented.

It is our conviction that the public is entitled to a system of selection that will open the doors to more candidates, provide careful and measured consideration of qualifications, and not be subject to partisan influences. Judges must be, and be seen to be, independent. Judges must be regarded as capable and knowledgeable. Finally, judges must be chosen from a variety of backgrounds and be representative of the

community. The need for independence is beyond question, and the demands of the Charter have given an additional dimension to such independence.

Our country is so large, and there are so many potential appointees, that it is impossible for ministers and cabinets to review and select candidates without the assistance of advisers. This feature of the present system is inevitable, given the busy schedule of ministers, but we take exception to the fact that the system is completely informal and unstructured and is carried on in private beyond public scrutiny. It is hardly surprising that such a system is inefficient, highly political and open to public criticism. Moreover, in the past, the selection and appointments process has concentrated too much responsibility in a single position - the office of special adviser on judicial appointments - without supporting that responsibility with a formalized system for gathering information and assessing candidates' qualifications. Canada deserves a better method of selecting the people that will preside in our courts of justice.

The system we propose is a Canadian one. We do not advocate the American system of election or congressional review. Neither would the methods used in England by the Lord Chancellor work in a Canadian setting. Essentially, what is needed is a selection process that reflects the independent traditions of the common law and the values of our federal state. With these preliminary observations in mind, we turn now to the committee's specific suggestions for reform.

Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Appointment of Judges has reached the following conclusions and recommendations:

Federal Judicial Appointments

1. The final decisions on appointments of judges must remain with the government. However, appointments must be made as the result of an established, well known and understood advisory process to facilitate selection of the best candidate.
2. Nominations or suggestions for candidates should be encouraged from a wide variety of sources - judges, lawyers, politicians at all levels and the public generally.
3. The Canadian Bar Association National Committee on the Judiciary has improved the process, but by its nature it cannot ensure that only the best candidates are considered for appointment.

4. In a federal system where judges adjudicate on both federal and provincial civil and criminal law, it is essential for meaningful consultation to take place between the federal appointing authority and provincial attorneys-general. This consultation has been inadequate or completely lacking in the past.
5. Consultation in advance of appointments should also take place with the chief justice of the relevant court. Here again, consultation has often been inadequate or completely lacking in the past.
6. The necessary consultations with attorneys-general should involve the federal minister of justice at some stage or, in cases that concern the prime minister's prerogative, the prime minister. These consultations are too important to be delegated completely to staff.
7. To avoid delays in filling vacancies on the bench, the selection process should be initiated well in advance of anticipated vacancies.
8. Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada must continue to be representative of the regions and legal systems of Canada. The minister of justice should consult the chief justice of Canada and the attorney-general (or minister of justice) of the province from which the appointment is to come, or the attorneys-general of the provinces in the region from which the appointment is to come. In addition, the minister of justice should obtain and take into consideration the views of all other provincial attorneys-general and ministers of justice.
9. Because the Federal Court of Canada is the only court for suits against the federal Crown, it is important that the selection process remove all perception of bias in favour of the federal government. At present, this court is perceived by many, rightly or wrongly, as a government-oriented court because so many former politicians and federal officials have been appointed to it.
10. Parliament should not play a role in the selection or appointment of federal judges. It is neither necessary nor desirable for the legislative branch to be involved. It is contrary to the Canadian tradition for the appointment of judges to be subjected to a congressional-type process of public examination and review.

Advisory Committees on Federal Judicial Appointments

The defects in the present system of selecting federal judges and, in particular, actual or perceived political favouritism or patronage, have led us inevitably to the conclusion that there is a need for a formalized system designed to obtain the best qualified people and to remove partisan influences. The device of including in the selection process a non-political body made up of judges, lawyers and members of the public, as well as representatives of the appointing authority, has been adopted in most provinces to cure the problem. It has worked well. In such provinces the quality of appointments has improved greatly without removing the appointing power from government. It is now time for this process to be adopted for federal appointments.

11. We therefore recommend that there be an Advisory Committee on Federal Judicial Appointments in each province and territory to advise the minister of justice on appointments to section 96 courts and to the Supreme Court of Canada.
12. Each provincial or territorial committee should be composed of the following members:
 - i) the chief justice of the province or territory, or his or her delegate, who would chair the committee;
 - ii) one person appointed by the federal minister of justice;
 - iii) one person appointed by the attorney-general or minister of justice of the province or territory;
 - iv) two lawyers, one appointed by the governing body of the legal profession and one by the branch of the Canadian Bar Association in the province or territory concerned; and
 - v) two lay people representative of the public to be appointed by majority vote of the other members of the committee. Government and Crown corporation employees, and Members of Parliament, the Senate or the provincial legislature would not be eligible for appointment as lay representatives.

Save for the chief justice or delegate, members should serve for a maximum term of five years, and terms should be staggered to ensure continuity. Travel, secretarial and out of pocket expenses of committee members should be the responsibility of the federal government.

13. A committee would be consulted by the federal minister of justice on all vacancies occurring in its province and would submit to the minister the names of no fewer than three people qualified to fill each position. Committees would consider names suggested by the minister and by other sources, and should also seek out names of candidates themselves.
14. While committees are understood to be advisory, the minister of justice would be expected to make each appointment from the list supplied or, failing agreement, to ask the committee to bring forward further recommendations.
15. Committees would establish their own procedures for determining the qualifications of candidates, including consultation with the chief justice or chief judge of the court concerned. All such investigations should be conducted in confidence.
16. The appropriate advisory committee should also be consulted by the minister of justice with respect to elevations from one court to another. Proposed elevations should not be treated differently from other appointments.
17. The prime minister should consult the appropriate committee with respect to the appointment of chief justices, associate chief justices and chief judges from among those already serving on the bench. Appointments to these positions direct from the bar should be treated in the same manner as other new appointments.
18. In the case of appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, the relevant advisory committee(s) would be the one for the province, or those of the provinces in the region, from which the appointment is to be made. For these appointments only, advisory committees could submit fewer than three names, or no name at all, if they deemed appropriate.

In the case of the Federal Court of Canada, the Tax Court, and any other federal courts that might be created, a separate advisory committee is required.

19. We therefore recommend that there be an Advisory Committee on Appointments to Federal Courts composed of the following members:

- i) the chief justice of the Federal Court of Canada, or his or her delegate, who would chair the committee;
- ii) one person appointed by the federal minister of justice;
- iii) two lawyers, one appointed by the Canadian Bar Association and one by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada; and
- iv) three other people, at least two of whom are lay people representative of the public, appointed by majority vote of the other members of the committee and taking into account the need for regional representation.

When the committee is considering appointments to the Tax Court, the chief judge of the Tax Court should also sit with the committee.

The membership criteria, term of office and advisory procedures that apply to provincial and territorial advisory committees (as described in recommendations 12 to 17 above) would also apply to this committee.

20. If the mechanisms and procedures we recommend are adopted, there will no longer be a need for the Canadian Bar Association National Committee on the Judiciary.

Provincial and Territorial Appointments

Judicial councils and selection committees responsible for recommending provincial and territorial judicial appointments are working well in some provinces and territories and have produced significant improvements in the quality of appointments. Selection processes in Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec, the Northwest Territories and the Yukon have several features in common that we consider essential to their success:

- Three constituencies - the bench, the bar and the general public - are represented on these councils or committees.
- The judicial council or selection committee can consider candidates from many sources, not only those proposed by the provincial attorney-general or minister of justice.
- Councils and committees also seek out candidates actively and inquire into and assess their qualifications.
- Councils or committees submit to the attorney-general or minister of justice short lists of candidates

assessed as those most highly qualified for the appointment in question.

- The provincial attorney-general or minister of justice selects a name from the list provided or, failing that, returns to the council of committee for further recommendations.
21. All provinces where these criteria are not met should adopt procedures, modify existing procedures, or adopt or amend legislation so that provincial appointing authorities are provided with an effective source of independent advice on judicial appointments. This will require the following steps:
- i) the procedures of the judicial councils of Ontario and Saskatchewan should be changed, by statute if necessary, so that they can propose names to the attorney-general;
 - ii) Manitoba and Nova Scotia should change the mandates of their judicial councils so that they have responsibility for recommending provincial judicial appointments;
 - iii) Nova Scotia should alter the membership of its council so that the public is represented by lay members; and
 - iv) New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island should establish judicial councils with appropriate mandates to recommend provincial judicial appointments.

This recommendation seeks to raise judicial selection procedures in all provinces to the standards established by British Columbia and Quebec.

22. Provincial and territorial appointments should be made only after consultation with the chief judge of the provincial or territorial court concerned.
23. In provinces and territories where justices of the peace carry out adjudicative functions, the procedure for selecting and appointing them should be the same as that for provincial court judges.

Criteria for Appointment

24. After discussing the basic qualifications and character requirements for judicial appointment with a large number of knowledgeable people that are, or have been, involved in appointing judges in Canada, the committee recommends the following list of essential qualities for men and women being considered for judicial appointment:
- High moral character
 - Human qualities: sympathy, generosity, charity, patience
 - Experience in the law
 - Intellectual and judgmental ability
 - Good health and good work habits
 - Bilingualism, if required by the nature of the post

25. In the present climate of public opinion about judicial appointments, and because of the appearance of political influence, it is inappropriate for cabinet ministers to be appointed directly to the bench. However, it would be unfair to exclude ex-ministers from consideration indefinitely. The committee therefore recommends that no such candidate be considered for appointment for at least two years after resigning from cabinet.

Training

We place significant emphasis on the need for experience in the law. Judges are required to interpret the law, and to do their jobs well, they must understand how it works in a practical way and how lawyers practise.

Related to experience in the law is the need, especially under present circumstances, for judges learned in the law with the ability to conduct research. A modern judge, particularly at the appellate level, is required to do a great deal of research and to write logically and well.

Ideally (as in England) trial judges should be drawn from the practising bar, from those lawyers with day-to-day experience in the courtroom. We recognize that in Canada this is an ideal and not always possible. In these circumstances it is essential for all newly appointed judges to be given adequate training to prepare them for the bench, particularly in the conduct of criminal trials and sentencing. We cannot emphasize too strongly the need for further training over and above what is already provided. Such additional training could also take the form of refresher courses for judges that have already acquired experience on the bench.

26. We therefore recommend that the government of Canada support the establishment of a national centre for judicial training and education for both federal and provincial judges. This would mean that courses for newly appointed judges would be available at all times, not only once a year as at present. We also invite the federal and provincial governments, the Canadian Judicial Council, the Canadian Bar Association and other interested groups to explore means to give practising lawyers an opportunity to serve in part-time judicial capacities in order to test or improve their qualifications for appointment to the bench.

Conditions of Employment

27. Both federal and provincial governments should look for ways to overcome two factors that inhibit well-qualified people from accepting judicial appointments. The Income Tax Act should be amended to eliminate double taxation during a judge's first year on the bench. Salaries and other benefits of judges in all courts, whether appointed federally or provincially, should be maintained at appropriate levels. Inflation protection for provincially appointed judge's salaries should be established by statute, as it is for federally appointed judges.